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“WAS THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN ANTI-
CHINESE?” 
JAMES W. GORDON* 
“My whole nature responds to the principle of equality of all men 
before the law, as well as to the principle of the equal protection by 
the laws for everyone in his personal and property rights.” – John 
Marshall Harlan1 
 
[T]o be labeled a prophet is to be held to an impossible standard.  In 
many ways, Harlan’s views fell short of our current notions of racial 
equality.  But Harlan was not a philosopher; he was a judge.  His job 
was not to divine eternal truths, but to make socially situated legal 
judgments.  It is correct to say that Harlan’s views on race were as 
problematic in some ways as they were progressive in others.  But in 
reaching that conclusion, we benefit from a century’s worth of 
hindsight and experience that Harlan did not have.2 
INTRODUCTION 
The first Justice John Marshall Harlan died on October 14, 1911.  
After years of practicing law, extended participation in politics, and 
almost thirty-four years of service on the Supreme Court of the United 
States, he left almost nothing of economic value to his family.  Harlan’s 
only legacy was his reputation.3 
 
 J.D., Ph.D. (History), University of Kentucky.  Professor of Law, Western New 
England University School of Law. 
1. Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Augustus E. Willson (n.d. 1895), microformed 
on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE, reel 11, frame 1248 
(Univ. of Louisville) [hereinafter HARLAN PAPERS, UL].  Harlan and Willson were close 
friends and Harlan was unusually candid in his letters to Willson, his former law partner. 
2. Goodwin Liu, The First Justice Harlan, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1383, 1392 (2008). 
3. For the factual details of Harlan’s life, see TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL 
ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN (1995) and LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL 
HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE (1992).  See also Louis Hartz, John M. Harlan in 
Kentucky, 1855-1877: The Story of His Pre-Court Career, 14 FILSON CLUB HIST. Q. 17 
(1940); Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The 
Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957). 
  One might well ask: What did Harlan make of his own lack of financial success?  In a 
moment of self-revelation, Harlan once observed “the large majority of statesmen . . . [have] 
died poor . . . . [A man goes into public life from the ambition that he will] live after he is dead 
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During the years Harlan served on the supreme bench, from 1877 to 
1911, the Court and the country dealt continually with questions 
involving race.  Both the Court and the country struggled to understand 
the consequences of the Civil War, to give meaning to the constitutional 
amendments it produced, and to replace slavery with a different 
paradigm for race relations.  Besides the old problems of Black and 
White, the Court faced additional new ones as the United States 
completed its destruction of Native American independence and culture, 
and struggled with immigration policy and popular hostility toward the 
Chinese.  In addition, after the Spanish-American War of 1898, the 
United States moved out into the world as an imperial power, annexing 
overseas territories with large populations of color for the first time.  The 
Court had to decide the status of these new possessions and their 
inhabitants under the Constitution.  All of these concerns involved issues 
of race and the interplay of race with policy, politics, and law. 
Harlan long has been recognized as a defender of Black civil 
rights.4  When he wrote a lone dissent in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases,5 
Frederick Douglass described Harlan as “a moral hero” and his attitude 
as “one of marked moral sublimity.”6  In another lonely dissent in Plessy 
v. Ferguson, the 1896 case in which the Court constitutionalized the 
principle of “separate but equal,” Harlan argued against classes of 
citizenship defined by race and, in a famous phrase, for a “color-blind” 
Constitution.7  When, in 1954, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka8 
 
and gone in the memory of his fellow citizens.  I can understand why a man may be willing to 
give his whole life, and lead a life of poverty and self-denial if by so doing he can make a 
great name in his country.”  John Marshall Harlan, Constitutional Law Lectures 1897-1898, at 
13-14 (Nov. 20, 1897) [hereinafter Harlan, Law Lectures], microformed on JOHN MARSHALL 
HARLAN PAPERS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS [hereinafter HARLAN PAPERS, LC], available at 
http://archive.org/details/JusticeJohnMarshallHarlanLecturesOnConstitutionalLaw1897-98_2 
6.  That Harlan valued his reputation so highly and sacrificed so much to leave behind a “great 
name in his country” makes it all the more important for those who would revise his 
reputation to tread carefully. 
4. Westin, supra note 3. 
5. 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
6. Frederick Douglass, Civil Rights and Judge Harlan, AMERICAN REFORMER, in 
HARLAN PAPERS, UL, supra note 1, at reel 7, frame 542.  Douglass also wrote Harlan directly 
to express his “gratitude and admiration” and to assure Harlan that “if you are alone on the 
Bench, you are not alone in the Country.”  Letter from Frederick Douglass to John Marshall 
Harlan (Nov. 27, 1883), in HARLAN PAPERS, UL, supra note 1, at reel 7, frame 541-43.  
Harlan’s high reputation among his Black contemporaries is illustrated by the fact that he was 
asked to, and did preside at the public Memorial for Douglass, held in Washington, D.C., in 
1895, when the great Black abolitionist leader died.  The Memorial gathering was attended by 
thousands of Black people.  WASH. POST, June 3, 1895.  
7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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overturned Plessy, the resurrection of Harlan’s powerful dissent, in 
support of Black equality before the law, elevated him to the status of a 
racial prophet.9 
A few scholars have found gaps in Harlan’s shining armor.  They 
have challenged Harlan’s reputation as a consistent defender of Black 
rights and have argued that he was insensitive to the rights of Native 
Americans.10  The most serious challenge to Harlan’s egalitarian 
reputation has come from scholars who have argued Harlan was anti-
Chinese.11  It is possible that Harlan’s egalitarianism had limits.  He was, 
after all, a man and not a prophet or a saint.  But the conclusion that 
Harlan was anti-Chinese fails to do justice to the ambiguity of the 
evidence and the complexity of Harlan’s entire record.  The argument 
rests, largely, upon a letter he wrote to one of his sons, who was 
preparing for a college debate, and on measuring his votes in the Chinese 
immigration cases against modern standards of “due process” and “equal 
protection;” standards which had, in his time, yet to be fully articulated.  
His critics largely ignore other cases in which he defended the civil 
rights of Chinese already resident in the United States.  They completely 
ignore Harlan’s dissents in the Insular Cases, in the early years of the 
Twentieth Century, in which he demanded application of the entire 
 
9. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Berea 
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 60 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting); FLOYD B. CLARK, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES OF JUSTICE HARLAN (Decapods 1969) (1915); Louis I. 
Maddocks, Justice John Marshall Harlan: Defender of Individual Rights (1959) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University). 
10. See J. Morgan Kousser, Separate but Not Equal: The Supreme Court’s First 
Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools, 46 J. S. HIST. 17 (1980); Earl M. Maltz, Only 
Partially Color-Blind: John Marshall Harlan’s View of Race and the Constitution, 12 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 973 (1996) [hereinafter Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind].  The two cases which 
are usually cited to show Harlan was not always pro-Black on civil rights are Pace v. 
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding a state statute imposing harsher punishment for 
adultery between Black and White partners than between same race partners) and Cumming v. 
County Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusing to order the 
closing of a White public high school because a public Black high school was closed).  See 
also, LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 2-3, 
99-102 (1999); Molly Townes O’Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan As Prophet: The Plessy 
Dissenter’s Color-Blind Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753, 775 (1996) 
(discussing the Cumming decision and offering other explanations for Harlan’s position).  
Additionally, the author further argues that Harlan was less egalitarian than originally 
believed; that he was paternalistic towards Blacks and believed in Anglo-Saxon racial 
superiority.  Id. at 97-99, 119-24, 140-42. 
11. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996) [hereinafter Chin, The Plessy Myth]; Gabriel J. Chin, The First 
Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just How Great Was “the Great Dissenter”, 32 AKRON L. 
REV. 629 (1999); Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind, supra note 10; see also 
PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 10, at 97-99, 118-122; YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 191-192. 
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Constitution to the inhabitants of color in the newly acquired overseas 
territories. 
  In this Article, I will discuss the evidence which has been offered 
to support the claim that Harlan was anti-Chinese and I will offer 
additional evidence never before presented to argue against this 
hypothesis.  Harlan’s critics have assembled some evidence in a way that 
suggests Harlan had an anti-Chinese bias.  I will suggest that the 
evidence is ambiguous and that it can be assembled to produce a 
different picture from the one Harlan’s critics create.  I will also argue 
that his critics give insufficient weight to the fact that, sitting as a judge, 
Harlan was often constrained in his decision-making by stare decisis and 
his conception of the judicial role.  The issues presented by the Chinese 
cases should be viewed in the context of their time and understood not as 
abstract statements of the Justices’ personal beliefs but as a series of 
discrete judicial problems presented to the Court for decision.  When one 
examines both the context and the details of the cases, the picture of 
Harlan that emerges is more nuanced than his critics have suggested. 
Harlan’s votes and opinions in the Chinese cases should not tarnish 
his reputation as a defender of civil rights.12  They are better explained 
by his general approach to judicial decision-making and his generalized 
concerns about immigration, than by racial animus.13  Even though he 
often deferred to the exercise of congressional power over Chinese 
immigration, Harlan was still a remarkably progressive judge when 
matters involving attacks on Chinese civil rights came before him.  This 
is true, especially, in light of the beliefs about race which were pervasive 
in his time.  By presenting my analysis, I hope to do justice to Harlan’s 
reputation not as a prophet but as a human being. 
 
12. In an earlier article about the influence of religion on Harlan, I accepted generally 
the argument that Harlan was anti-Chinese without examining carefully all of the evidence 
cited in its support.  Having now reviewed the evidence more fully and having thought more 
deeply about the question, I am now less inclined to accept that view for the reasons set out in 
this Article.  See James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A Case Study in 
Late Nineteenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 317, 395-402 
(2001). 
13. Three broad principles usually guided Harlan’s judicial decision-making.  First, he 
favored the exercise of broad national power in those areas assigned to the national 
government.  Second, he favored judicial restraint, respecting the exercise of legislative 
power.  Third, if possible, he preferred to read constitutional and legislative language literally.  
These three principles influenced many of Harlan’s judicial positions.  All three argued for 
sustaining national civil rights legislation guaranteeing Black Americans equal rights as 
citizens under the Reconstruction Amendments, which clearly had been enacted for their 
protection.  The same principles argued against judicial intervention to overturn congressional 
decisions involving Chinese immigration. 
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I.  THE CONTEXT OF THE CHINESE CASES 
The story of the Chinese in America and their struggle for civil 
rights in the last third of the nineteenth century has been well-told by a 
number of scholars and it is not my purpose to retell it here.14  However, 
a brief outline of the story is necessary to provide context for the 
Chinese cases that came to Harlan’s Court. 
The Chinese suffered terrible discrimination in the United States in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.15  Anti-Chinese racism, 
fed by vicious stereotypes, created an atmosphere in which attacks on 
Chinese immigration and Chinese residents took place.16 
The Chinese first came to the United States in large numbers in the 
1840s.  Most were young and male and came to labor in the gold fields 
or to establish trading ventures.  Their status was first regulated by the 
Burlingame Treaty in 1868.17  Under this treaty, Chinese subjects were 
guaranteed the right to come to, remain in, and leave the United States.  
They were also granted the privileges, immunities, and exemptions 
enjoyed by the citizens of the most favored nation.  As their numbers 
 
14. Among the best scholarship on the subject is ANDREW GYORY, RACE, POLITICS, 
AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT (1998) and CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF 
EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (1994).  See also STUART C. MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE 
AMERICAN IMAGE OF THE CHINESE, 1785-1882 (1969); JEAN PFAELZER, DRIVEN OUT: THE 
FORGOTTEN WAR AGAINST CHINESE AMERICANS (2007); MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE, 
CHINESE IMMIGRATION (1909), available at http://www.archive.org/stream/chineseimmigrat0 
0coolgoog (Coolidge was a pioneering sociologist and her study is filled with important facts); 
LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND THE SHAPING OF 
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995); ELMER C. SANDMYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT 
IN CALIFORNIA (1971 reprt. 1939); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: 
LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1995).  
15. For the history of the Chinese experience in the United States during these years, 
see ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION 
ERA, 1882-1943 (2007) and PFAELZER, supra note 14.  For an in depth treatment of the 
genesis of the first Chinese Exclusion Act see GYORY, supra note 14; and COOLIDGE, supra 
note 14.  For a general chronological survey of the legal history of Asian Americans, see 
HYUNG-CHAN KIM, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS, 1790-1990 (1994).  For an 
account of how the struggles of Chinese immigrants shaped modern immigration law, see 
SALYER, supra note 14.  See also Earl M. Maltz, The Federal Government and the Problem of 
Chinese Rights in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223 
(1995) [hereinafter Maltz, The Federal Government]. 
16. The anti-Chinese feeling was strongest on the West Coast where most of the 
Chinese lived, but it was not limited to the Western states.  See MILLER, supra note 14, at 167-
172.  For an interesting, gendered analysis of these stereotypes, see Karen J. Leong, “A 
Distinct and Antagonistic Race”: Constructions of Chinese Manhood in the Exclusionist 
Debates, 1869-78, in AMERICAN DREAMING, GLOBAL REALITIES: RETHINKING U.S. 
IMMIGRATION HISTORY 141-157 (Donna R. Gabaccia & Vicki L. Ruiz, eds. 2006). 
17. Treaty of July 28, 1868, U.S.-China, 16 Stat. 739. 
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increased their White neighbors became increasingly hostile to their 
presence.  California became a focus of anti-Chinese activity.  Many 
White Californians opposed Chinese immigration and sought to drive-
out the Chinese who were already there.  States and localities enacted 
laws discriminating against the Chinese and there were intermittent 
spasms of violence.18  The Chinese community resisted these strategies 
in the political arena and, more successfully, for a time, in the courts.19 
When the state of California tried to ban Chinese immigration 
outright, the law was struck down as an unconstitutional invasion of 
national power.20  White Californians then shifted their focus and 
agitated for a national policy of exclusion.  In 1880, China and the 
United States negotiated a new treaty that permitted the United States to 
limit, regulate, or suspend the entry of Chinese laborers into the 
country.21  In 1882, with the sanction of the 1880 treaty, Congress passed 
the first Chinese Exclusion Act.22  This statute suspended for a ten year 
“trial period” the right of Chinese laborers to enter the country.  It also 
required those already legally here to obtain identity certificates when 
they went abroad if they wished to be readmitted to the country upon 
their return.23  The act further required Chinese merchants and others 
still permitted entry into the United States to obtain certificates from 
their home countries, vised by American diplomatic officials stationed 
there, certifying facts that established they were qualified (as non-
laborers) to enter.24 
This Exclusion regime was refined and tightened over the next 
twenty years.  After an 1884 amendment, Chinese laborers previously 
resident in the country could re-enter only if they could produce the 
required identification certificate, which now became the only 
acceptable proof of prior residence.25  The Scott Act of 1888 went 
further.  It voided existing certificates thus denying the right to re-enter 
the country even to those who had fully complied with the earlier acts.26  
 
18. See MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 9-144.  For many examples of violence directed at 
the Chinese, see PFAELZER, supra note 14. 
19. MCCLAIN, supra note 14. 
20. In re Ah Fong, 1 F.Cas. 213 (1874).  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held that 
the regulation of immigration was a matter solely for the national government.  Chy Lung v. 
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
21. Treaty of Nov. 17, 1880, U.S.-China, 22 Stat. 828. 
22. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, §§ 1-15, 22 Stat. 58, 58-61. 
23. For details of the various Exclusion Acts, see MCCLAIN, supra note 14. 
24. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 6, 22 Stat. 58. 
25. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 4, 23 Stat. 115, 115-16. 
26. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, §§ 1-4, 25 Stat. 504. 
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The Geary Act of 1892 extended for another ten years all existing 
exclusion legislation and required all Chinese laborers residing in the 
United States to obtain a certificate of residence (identity papers) within 
one year or be subject to summary deportation.27  The Geary Act also 
created a presumption that any Chinese laborer without a certificate was 
in the country illegally.  Fearing perjury by Chinese witnesses, the Geary 
Act also required testimony from at least one White witness to prove 
legal residence prior to the act where the certificate or a duplicate from 
the customs records could not be produced.  Under the Geary Act, any 
Chinese person who did not, or could not, comply with the Act, could be 
sentenced to one year in prison at hard labor before being deported. 
In 1902 the various Exclusion Acts were renewed and applied to the 
new island territories annexed at the end of the Spanish-American War 
and to Hawaii.28  Finally, in 1904, they were extended indefinitely.29  In 
the years following each of these enactments, the federal courts, in 
applying the Exclusion regime, decided many cases requiring 
interpretation of congressional intent.  The courts also faced repeated 
claims for protection against government discrimination and mob 
violence directed at lawfully resident Chinese.  A number of these cases 
made their way to the Supreme Court upon which Justice Harlan sat. 
Recent scholarship suggests that the traditional notion that the 
United States had essentially welcomed all immigrants before concerns 
about Chinese immigration all but closed the “golden door” was a 
myth.30  Still, there is little doubt that the enactment of the Chinese 
Exclusion regime moved immigration restriction to the center of national 
concern and energized an intensive push for immigration restriction that 
produced a series of restrictive laws in the fifty years which followed. 
 
27. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, §§ 1, 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25-26. 
28. Act of Apr. 29, 1902, ch. 641, § 1, 32 Stat. 176-77. 
29. Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630, § 5, 33 Stat. 428, 428.  The Exclusion regime 
remained in place until 1943. 
30. See Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Prejudice Against Immigration, in A COMPANION 
TO AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 177-201 (Reed Ueda ed., 2006); Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment 
of Transition: State Officials, the Federal Government, and the Formation of American 
Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. HIST. 1092 (Mar. 2013); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century 
of American Immigration Law (1776-1876), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).  The “golden 
door” image is drawn from Emma Lazarus’s famous poem “The New Colossus.”  Ironically, 
Lazarus wrote the poem in 1883, one year after the golden door had been closed for the 
Chinese by the first Chinese Exclusion Act.  Even more ironically, in 1903 her words were 
attached to the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor to become part of the 
symbol of America’s welcome to immigrants.  Of course, it might be observed, the Statue of 
Liberty faces the Atlantic and not the Pacific to welcome Europeans, not Asians. 
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II. THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY HARLAN’S CRITICS 
Some modern scholars have argued that Harlan was anti-Chinese; 
that he was, at best, only “partially color-blind.”31  They suggest Harlan 
failed to apply the principle of equality before the law to the Chinese that 
he famously demanded for Black Americans.  These critics imply or 
expressly allege that the source of this differential treatment was 
Harlan’s anti-Chinese racism.  One scholar concluded: “Harlan rather 
plainly shared the widespread prejudice against the Chinese that led to 
the passage of the Exclusion Acts and the Geary Act.”32  While 
acknowledging that Harlan’s record even in the Chinese immigration 
cases was mixed, these scholars have failed to give sufficient weight to 
his position in other cases involving the rights of Chinese already 
resident in the country.  They give little or no consideration to the role 
played by Harlan’s default positions favoring national power and judicial 
restraint in explaining the immigration cases and dismiss the parallels in 
his positions in defense of Black civil rights and his defense of these 
rights for the Chinese.33  Although Harlan’s most recent biographers 
 
31. See Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11; Chin, Harlan By the Numbers, supra 
note 11; Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind, supra note 10.  A recent search of citing 
references on Westlaw disclosed that Professor Chin’s, The Plessy Myth, has been cited in 
eighty-two law review articles; his Harlan By the Numbers, in fourteen; and Professor Maltz’s 
Only Partially Color-Blind, in fourteen.  Almost all of these articles cite the Chin and Maltz 
articles as proof that Harlan was anti-Chinese.  Even the web’s WIKIPEDIA entry on Harlan 
states: “Harlan was also viewed by some as oppositional toward other races, such as Chinese.”  
John Marshall Harlan, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Marshall_Harlan 
(last visited May 14, 2014).  
32. Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind, supra note 10, at 1001.   
33. Chin cites far more cases than does Maltz and acknowledges the complexity of 
Harlan’s voting record in these cases. 
Harlan’s work in interpreting the nuances of the regime of exclusion laws was more 
mixed after the constitutionality of racial exclusion was settled.  For example, he 
twice joined decisions of the Court finding in favor of Chinese deportees on the 
facts.  He interpreted some provisions of the exclusion laws in favor of Chinese 
immigrants.  Finally, Harlan joined a unanimous Court in holding that the 
Constitution required indictment and jury trial before a deportable Chinese person 
could be criminally punished for being in the United States.  More often, though, he 
construed ambiguous sections of statutes and treaties against Chinese litigants. 
Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 161-62.  Maltz makes a similar acknowledgment 
when he writes:  
Obviously this attitude [as expressed in Harlan’s reference to the Chinese in his 
Plessy dissent] did not predispose Harlan to support Chinese claims of constitutional 
rights.  At the same time, however, Harlan remained committed to the concept that 
the Constitution protected natural rights, and to a broad conception of federal power 
to enforce those rights.  Given these sometimes conflicting factors, it is not 
surprising that Harlan’s voting record on cases involving the rights of the Chinese 
was somewhat mixed. 
Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind, supra note 10, at 1002. 
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have found the evidence persuasive,34 the evidence is limited.  It consists 
of: (1) some ill-chosen words Harlan included in his Plessy dissent 
making reference to the Chinese (what I will call the Plessy fault); (2) a 
letter Harlan wrote to one of his sons in 1883, suggesting lines of 
argument the younger man might use in a college debate; (3) remarks he 
made during his constitutional law lectures in 1898;35 and (4) the critics 
interpretation of his votes and opinions in the cases involving the 
Chinese which came to the Supreme Court while he served on the high 
bench.  Since Harlan wrote in only a handful of these cases, much of 
their interpretation rests on his silent participation in the opinions of 
others. 
Harlan’s critics relegate to insignificance or rationalize away other 
 
34. See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 10, at 120-22, 233 n.24; see also YARBROUGH, 
supra note 3, at 190-92. 
35. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 10, at 120-21.  A student asked Harlan whether a 
person born in the United States to Chinese non-citizen parents could be a citizen.  After 
warning he could not answer the question because of a pending case (Wong Kim Ark discussed 
infra Part III.C) and:  
stressing that he was “now giving the argument for one side,” he noted that the 
Chinese had long been excluded “upon the idea that this is a race utterly foreign to 
us and never will assimilate with us.”  They were pagans.  Neither the Chinese nor 
the Americans wanted to intermarry.  “And when they die, no matter how long they 
have been here, they make arrangements to be sent back to their Fatherland.” 
He then asked his students “what would be the condition to-day” of the 
western slope without the exclusion acts.  [V]ast numbers of Chinese “would have 
rooted out the American population.” . . . “Of course, the argument on the other side 
is that the very words of the constitution embrace such a case.” 
Id.  Although at first blush these ideas suggest an anti-Chinese bias, it is important to 
recognize that they are also an accurate description of the views expressed by various Justices 
(other than Harlan) in earlier Court opinions.  See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 
581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).  Since he was teaching a 
class focused on constitutional law, it was appropriate for Harlan to reply to the student’s 
question by reporting what the Court had previously written on the subject.   
  The above exchange took place at a lecture Harlan gave on March 19, 1898.  The 
decision in Wong Kim Ark was handed down on March 28, 1898.  Almost certainly, Harlan 
had the case law and the arguments for and against Wong Kim Ark fresh in his mind not only 
from the arguments of counsel, but also from the arguments made by his fellow justices in 
conference.  It also seems likely that he was already aware of what the opinions in the case 
would say. 
  After citing the exchange with Harlan’s students, Professor Przybyszewski discusses 
Fuller’s dissent in Wong Kim Ark, in which Harlan joined, implying that Harlan’s statements 
to his class reflected his own views on the matter.  Given the repeated warnings he gave to his 
students, that he could not answer because the case was pending and that he was only offering 
arguments, it seems he was carefully denying that he was speaking his own views.  It is 
possible that Harlan was merely offering the arguments he had recently heard made in support 
of exclusion and the denial of citizenship to the Chinese, rather than stating his own views.  
Sometimes a speaker or writer means only what he or she says or writes, and there is no 
deeper meaning than what the words themselves say. 
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important evidence of Harlan’s attitude toward the Chinese.36  He 
insisted that the Court take seriously treaty obligations benefitting the 
Chinese.37  He asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause and federal civil rights statutes protected Chinese 
residents against state and local discrimination, justified by local 
authorities under the police power.38  On the same grounds, he justified 
the use of national power to protect the Chinese from mob violence.39  
Furthermore, in his dissents in the Insular Cases, after American 
annexation of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawaii, Harlan argued 
fiercely and repeatedly that residents of the annexed territories, without 
regard to race or national origin, were entitled to all of the Constitutional 
protections embodied in the Bill of Rights and other American law.40  
Harlan’s critics have either ignored these decisions or have dismissed 
their implications for the argument that Harlan was anti-Chinese.41 
Finally, in looking only at Harlan’s response to the Chinese, his 
critics have overlooked the more generalized nativist strand in Harlan’s 
thought, which, though muted in his later years remained an influence 
making him suspicious of all immigrants without regard to their race.42 
A.    The Plessy Dissent Fault in Context 
Harlan’s critics often quote a paragraph from Harlan’s Plessy 
dissent, which they argue reveals a racist fault.  In Plessy, Harlan wrote: 
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those 
 
36. See, for example, Professor Chin’s treatment of Harlan’s Chew Heong opinion and 
the Court’s Yick Wo decision.  Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts 
About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV 1359 (2008). 
37. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
38. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 112 U.S. 356 (1886). 
39. Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
40. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 375 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Dorr v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 
197, 226 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
41. Neither Chin nor Maltz discuss the Insular Cases at all.  Przybyszewski and 
Yarbrough both address the Insular Cases but do not connect them with Harlan’s attitude 
toward the Chinese.  As a result, they all overlook what I believe was Harlan’s ultimate 
reconciliation of whatever views on the Chinese he held, with republicanism—a resolution his 
dissents in the Insular Cases embody. 
42. See Harlan’s reflections on his participation, in the 1850s, in the American Party 
(the Know-Nothing Party) which he regretted.  Despite his regrets, Harlan continued to 
rationalize that membership and continued to speak with concern about the negative effect of 
white immigrants who had no understanding of, or experience with, American institutions.  
John Marshall Harlan, The Know-Nothing Organization, in HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 
3, at reel 8, frame 377-88.  See also Westin, supra note 3. 
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belonging to it to become citizens of the United States.  Persons 
belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from 
our country.  I allude to the Chinese race.  But by the statute in 
question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with 
white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race 
[cannot] . . . .43 
As one examines the problematic quotation three things stand out.  
First, in context, it is apparent that Harlan was using the reference to 
discrimination against the Chinese to challenge the unequal treatment of 
African-Americans, not to support discrimination against the Chinese.  
Harlan offered the reference to show the irrationality of discrimination 
against Blacks, who were expressly protected in their rights as citizens 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, while similar discrimination was not, 
theoretically, directed at the non-citizen Chinese.  Harlan’s argument 
was that citizens should have more, not fewer, rights than aliens, not that 
aliens should have no rights. 
Second, Harlan is not endorsing the popular attitudes underlying 
discrimination against the Chinese, but rather, describing those attitudes.  
That he would have the example of the Chinese in mind when discussing 
discrimination is not surprising given the number of cases involving the 
Chinese which came to the Court in the 1880s and 1890s. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is clear from the entire 
dissenting opinion in Plessy that Harlan is challenging distinctions 
among citizens based on race.  If the Chinese became citizens, they also 
would fall within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees of equality among citizens of the United States without regard 
to their race.44  That Harlan read the language of the Amendment 
 
43. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting).  See Chin, The 
Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 156; see also Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind, supra note 10, 
at 1002.  There have been even harsher characterizations of Harlan’s choice of language in 
Plessy.  Professor Neil Gotanda described Harlan’s references to the “dominance” of the 
White race in Plessy and to the Chinese, as “unambiguous statements about the Chinese and 
their racial position.”  Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the 
Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1701 (2000).  Gotanda continued: “In Harlan’s 
vision, the Chinese were unqualified to become Americans.  They were not so necessarily 
inferior; rather, they were so different that they were properly excluded from citizenship.  
Harlan was consistent and forceful in his advocacy of this position.”  Id. at 1702.  
44. Harlan said as much elsewhere in the Plessy dissent: “The sure guaranty of the 
peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our 
governments, national and state, of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the 
equality before the law of all citizens of the United States, without regard to race.”  Plessy, 
163 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added).  Harlan’s dissent in one of the Insular Cases, Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), made this same point explicitly: 
Whether a particular race will or will not assimilate with our people, and whether 
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literally seems clear when one considers the Justice’s other opinions in 
cases involving assertions, by Chinese petitioners, of rights claimed 
under treaties or as “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment.45  By 
1896, when Harlan penned these words in Plessy, the denial of Chinese 
admission to citizenship through naturalization had been (for the time 
being) settled by Congress and acquiesced in by the Court so often that it 
was no longer open to question.46 
For Harlan, the literal distinction the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment made between citizens and non-citizens was important.  It 
partly explains his greater solicitude for the rights of Black Americans 
than for those of the Chinese.  In the same paragraph in which he made 
the quoted reference to the Chinese, he was explicit on this point.  The 
Black citizens of Louisiana, discriminated against by the Plessy statute, 
unlike the Chinese at the time, 
[were] entitled, by law, to participate in the political control of the 
state and nation, . . . not excluded, by law or by reason of their race, 
from public stations of any kind, and who [had] all the legal rights 
that belong to white citizens, [but they are] declared to be criminals, 
liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by 
citizens of the white race.47 
It is true that Harlan argued that Blacks had earned these rights and, 
although it has been suggested that the reference invidiously pits one 
disadvantaged race against another,48 Harlan’s reference to Blacks 
 
they can or cannot with safety to our institutions be brought within the operation of 
the Constitution, is a matter to be thought of when it is proposed to acquire their 
territory by treaty.  A mistake in the acquisition of territory . . . cannot be made the 
ground for violating the Constitution or refusing to give full effect to its provisions. 
Id. at 384.  He made the same point in the letter, infra Part II.B, he wrote to his son suggesting 
lines of argument the son might use in a debate about the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.  “If 
they [Chinese laborers] come, we must admit them to citizenship, then to suffrage” and that 
means extending to them all of the rights of citizens because “all citizens are made equal 
before the law.”  Letter from John Marshall Harlan to James Shanklin Harlan (Jan. 21, 1883), 
in HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at reel 1, frame 296-298 (emphasis added). 
45. See Harlan’s opinions in Chew Heong, Baldwin v. Franks, and the Insular Cases 
infra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 171-84, 249-66. 
46. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 61 (“hereafter no state court or court 
of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship”) (repealed 1943).  The Court would 
not revisit this question until 1898 when in Wong Kim Ark the Court had to decide whether 
children born in the United States to resident non-citizen Chinese were citizens by birth under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
47. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561.  
48. See Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 175-76; see also PRZYBYSZEWSKI, 
supra note 10, at 121 (discussing this language).  However, Harlan’s words may be nothing 
more than a reference to Frederick Douglass’ famous argument that if Blacks fought for the 
Union, they would earn the rights of citizenship.  See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY 
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“many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the 
Union,” in context, seems no more than a reference to the costliest duty 
of citizenship: the duty to fight, bleed, and, if necessary, die for one’s 
country.  Many public figures who, like Harlan, had experienced the 
hardships of military service during the Civil War and seen Black 
regiments in the field, believed that African-Americans had earned the 
explicit reference to their citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment by 
their service to the Union. 
It is also important to remember that Harlan’s analytic framework 
for his Plessy dissent was the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
explicit references to Blacks as a formerly enslaved and now 
constitutionally protected race.  As Harlan said explicitly in his Plessy 
dissent: “[These Amendments] had, as this court has said, a common 
purpose, namely, to secure ‘to a race recently emancipated, a race that 
through many generations have been held in slavery, all the civil rights 
that the superior race enjoy.’”49  The protection extended was protection 
of the rights Black Americans possessed under the new constitutional 
guarantees of citizenship embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which had overturned Chief Justice Taney’s infamous denial of Black 
citizenship in Dred Scott.50  For Harlan, as for most of his 
contemporaries who espoused legal equality for Blacks, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was made necessary by the Dred Scott decision—a decision 
about citizenship and Black Americans.  Given this context, it was 
natural for Harlan to think of these issues in terms of Black and White. 
One scholar has criticized Harlan for his “formalist” reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.51  The criticism of Harlan in this respect 
amounts to two charges.  First, it implies that Harlan was wrong because 
he did not give the Fourteenth Amendment then the broader and far more 
appealing construction it receives now.  Although all today would agree 
that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches 
far beyond African-Americans, it seems unfair to condemn Harlan for 
interpreting the language of the amendment as it was generally 
understood in his own time rather than anticipating almost one hundred 
years of yet to be developed judicial articulation of the amendment.52  If 
 
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 564 (1988) (quoting DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY, Aug. 1863). 
49. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555-56. 
50. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 393 (1857). 
51. “Harlan applied a formalistic approach to the Fourteenth Amendment.  Although in 
some sense plausible, Harlan’s understanding of the Equal Protection Clause did not include 
what now seems to be its most attractive feature: a notion of at least legal equality among all 
races.”  Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 171 (emphasis added). 
52. See John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese 
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Harlan had been so prescient as to anticipate these future developments, 
one wonders whether he would have been willing, strategically, to rest 
his defense of Black rights on these expansive grounds when the struggle 
for equal treatment before the law for Black Americans was in so 
precarious a state in 1896 even when supported by the literal language of 
the Amendment. 
Second, while acknowledging Harlan’s tendency to default to strict 
construction, by using the word “formalism” (with its negative 
connotations), it is implied that Harlan should have abandoned this 
approach in order to extend the protection of the Amendment to defend 
the Chinese.  The argument that Harlan was formalistic in his approach 
to the Fourteenth Amendment assumes that formalism is always a pose, 
masking a different, deeper motivation.  But, sometimes a literal, 
formalist posture is an honest, if not entirely sufficient, approach to 
judicial analysis.  Strict construction was not merely a pose for Harlan, 
clothing he put on or took off at pleasure.  Rather, it was part of his 
essential approach to statutes and the Constitution, growing, perhaps, out 
of his strict Old School Presbyterian biblical literalism.  Harlan’s first 
reading of any text was a literal reading.  He went beyond this approach 
only when he believed the language ambiguous or contradicted by the 
ends the language was intended to accomplish.  Harlan’s literalism in his 
reading of the Civil War Amendments in Plessy is similar to the 
approach he took to most texts. 
If Harlan did give “overwhelming weight [in Plessy] to the 
circumstances which gave rise to the Reconstruction Amendments,”53 
this fact seems scarcely a valid criticism in the face of Harlan’s 
conception of judicial role.  Harlan often argued for judicial restraint and 
many of his most vociferous denunciations of Court majorities involved 
what he considered to be the unwarranted assertion of judicial power in 
usurpation of the legislative or political function.54 
 
Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and 
Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L. J. 55, 79-82 (1996); Maltz, The Federal Government, supra 
note 15; see also EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 
1863-1869, at 63-67 (1990). 
53. Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 171. 
54. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82 (1911) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled 
in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust, 158 
U.S. 601, 638 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18 
(1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Harlan, Law Lectures (Dec. 11, 1897), in HARLAN 
PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at 9 (“[T]he rule is fundamental both in reference to state and 
federal constitutions that the judiciary shall not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional 
unless it is plainly and palpably so . . . .”); Harlan, Law Lectures (Jan. 22, 1898), in HARLAN 
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Some of Harlan’s critics have pointed to other language in his 
Plessy dissent, to suggest that Harlan was infected with Anglo-Saxon 
race pride.55  Of course, it is possible that Harlan was proud of his 
ancestry, as he was proud of his Presbyterian faith, without assuming he 
would denigrate the ancestry or religion of others.  But, I suggest, even 
this reading divorces his words from their context in the dissent.  In the 
opinion itself, it is clear that Harlan was offering the comment about 
pride of race not to lift up Whites, or to diminish Blacks or other persons 
of color, but rather to shame his white auditors into living up to the 
equality before the law that he believed was the genius of the American 
legal and political tradition.  His words were less an argument about 
Anglo-Saxon superiority than a demand that Whites live up to their own 
ideals as he understood them.  If one reads the pseudo-scientific, racial 
rationale for the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ opinion in Commonwealth 
v. Berea College56 and Harlan’s dissent, when the case came to the 
Supreme Court on appeal, rejecting that rationale, it is hard to conclude 
that he believed in the physical and genetic superiority of Whites and the 
inferiority of other races.  Harlan’s dissent repudiated the elaborate racial 
theory upon which the court below had based its decision, with a few 
well-chosen words.57  However, the question whether Harlan took pride 
in his Anglo-Saxon ancestry or not misses the more important point.  
 
PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at 18-19 (“[N]o court [should] . . . strike down an act of legislation 
as unconstitutional and void unless it is clearly so . . . .  [W]hen the question arises as to 
whether a particular law does or does not transcend the authority of the government, if the 
court doubts, its duty is to hold its hands off; respect the will of the people expressed in this 
law . . . .”). 
55. PRZYBYZSEWSKI, supra note 10, at 87.  But, Professor Przybyzsewski quotes only 
part of the paragraph that Harlan wrote.  The entire paragraph reads: 
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the constitution of the United States 
does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be 
protected in the enjoyment of such rights.  Every true man has pride of race, and 
under appropriate circumstances, when the rights of others, his equals before the 
law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such 
action based upon it as to him seems proper.  But I deny that any legislative body or 
judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of 
those citizens are involved.  Indeed, such legislation as that here in question is 
inconsistent not only with that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, 
national and state, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the 
United States.  
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-555 (1886) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
56. Commonwealth v. Berea College, 94 S.W. 623 (Ky. 1906).  
57. “Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race than an American 
government, professedly based on the principles of freedom, and charged with the protection 
of all citizens alike, can make distinctions between such citizens in the matter of their 
voluntary meeting for innocent purposes, simply because of their respective races?”  Berea 
Coll. v. Commonwealth, 211 U.S. 45, 69 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Harlan demanded equal treatment before the law for all men, of 
whatever color, and insisted that the protections of the Constitution, not 
expressly limited to citizens, apply to all persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States.58  In the eyes of the law, he argued over and over 
again, color did not matter.59 
B.  The Letter: Harlan Suggests Lines of Argument in Support of 
Chinese Exclusion for a Princeton University Debate 
Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence used to support the 
hypothesis that Harlan was an anti-Chinese racist is a private letter he 
wrote to his son James, in 1883.60  James was an undergraduate at 
 
58. See infra text accompanying notes 159-74, 259-266. 
59. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 
678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110 (1884) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).  The Insular Cases infra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 171-84, 249-66. 
60. Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 160 (quoting letter from John Marshall 
Harlan to James Shanklin Harlan (Jan. 21, 1883), in HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at 
reel 1, frame 296-98); see also YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 190-92.  The text of the letter is 
set out below. 
Washington DC 
Jan 21/83  
Dear James, 
The speeches of Senators Jones and Miller will give you, I suppose, all 
the facts you need for your debate.  I do not know what they said, but I suggest this 
line of thought. 
The first duty of every man is to his own household.  Upon these thoughts 
we owe to our country & people a higher duty than one owed to any other country 
or people.  Therefore, the first inquiry over the Chinese bill is what is best for our 
own country.  We are not bound, upon any broad principle of humanity, to harm our 
own country in order to benefit the Chinese who may come here.  We have, in our 
keeping, the destiny of republican institutions – that is, here is to be tested the 
stability of free institutions, based upon the consent of the people & under which all 
citizens are made equal before the law – Now if by the introduction of Chinese labor 
we deprive[?] our own laborers, why not restrict the immigration of Chinese – The 
Chinese are of a different race, as distinct from ours as ours is from the negro – 
Suppose there was a tide of immigration setting in here from America [sic] of 
uneducated African savages – would we not restrict their coming?  Would we desist 
because they are human beings & upon the idea that they have a right to better their 
condition?  The Chinese are, largely, educated – But not those coming here – And 
of those coming [?] many are against – will not assimilate to our people.  If they 
come, we must admit them to citizenship, then to suffrage – what would become of 
the country in such a contingency.  Under the 10 year statute we have the 
opportunity to test the question whether it is safe to let down the bars & permit 
unrestricted immigration – The Chinese here will, in that time, show of what stuff 
they are made – Our policy is to keep this country, distinctively, under American 
influence.  Only Americans, or those who become such, by long stay here, 
understand American institutions. 
I hope you will go into that debate, & talk out as if you did not care for 
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Princeton and was to participate in a formal debate over the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882.  Justice Harlan offered to help him with his 
preparation.  There are a number of reasons for one to be cautious in 
drawing conclusions about Harlan’s personal views from this letter. 
First, and most obviously, we cannot know whether Harlan was 
expressing his own views, or merely suggesting lines of argument which 
he believed might have persuasive force in a formal college debate.  
Some of Harlan’s critics acknowledge this problem, but go on to suggest 
that Harlan believed what he wrote.61  Without this letter, the other 
evidence is far more ambiguous.  Indeed, without it, one wonders 
whether the argument that Harlan was an anti-Chinese racist would have 
been made at all. 
It seems unlikely that Harlan would express his personal views, 
even in a private letter, on a matter which he must have known would 
eventually come to the Court upon which he sat for resolution.  We 
know that Harlan routinely refused to discuss publicly legal issues that 
might come to the Court, noting that he must not pre-judge them.  It 
would be surprising if he violated what was for him such an important 
principle, even in a private letter to his son. 
Second, it seems certain that Harlan wrote this letter hastily, 
without time for research or reflection.  The physical characteristics of 
the letter itself suggest haste with its obvious mistakes.  The letter 
contains a series of sentence fragments, some almost incoherent, 
connected with dashes.  Additionally, the handwriting in the letter is 
even more difficult to decipher than his usual script, suggesting that he 
scribbled the note. 
Other correspondence indicates that Harlan sent his suggestions for 
argument on short notice.  After learning that his son, James, was to 
 
the result.  Once break the ice, & you will have no trouble.  But the think [sic] is to 
break the ice & plunge in.  All well 
affy 
Father 
Letter from John Marshall Harlan to James Shanklin Harlan (Jan. 21, 1883), in HARLAN 
PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at reel 1, frame 296-98.  Harlan often used the phrase: “then what 
would become of the country?” or similar language rhetorically in his lectures on the 
Constitution when he “supposed” a proposition and wanted his students to consider the 
practical effects of applying that proposition.  See Harlan, Law Lectures (Oct. 21, 1897), in 
HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at 9; Id. at 14 (Oct. 30, 1897); Id. at 9 (Nov. 13, 1897); Id. 
at 11, 17-18 (Dec. 18, 1897); Id. at 9, 12 (Dec. 18, 1897); Id. at 4 (Jan. 15, 1898). 
61. “There is, of course, the literal point that these views were only an argument; Harlan 
did not adopt them as his own.”  Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 160.  Yarbrough 
makes this same point in his Harlan biography but then qualifies it.  YARBROUGH, supra note 
3, at 191.  For comparable treatment of a recitation of arguments against Chinese citizenship 
in Harlan’s law lectures, see PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 10, at 120-21. 
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participate in the debate, Harlan offered, in a letter to James, dated 
January 7, 1883, to help his son prepare.  “If you know the subject [of 
the debate] in time I may be able to give you some aid with books, 
suggestions &c.”62  On Saturday, January 20, Harlan’s wife, Mallie, 
responded to a letter from James asking for his father’s help: 
Your letter of yesterday is just received and I write hurriedly to say 
that papa will send you something on your question for debate at 
latest by Tuesday Morning.  This is his busiest day in Court and 
unless the Senate is in session he may not be able to get anything 
before Monday.  If the Senate is in session he can write to some 
friend there and get what he wants but will not have time today to 
look it up himself.  He doubts whether you have last winter’s 
Congressional Report yet in Princeton.  He will attend to it at once, 
of that you may be sure . . . .63 
Harlan’s letter offering pro-exclusion arguments is dated the next 
day, Sunday, January 21, 1883.64  He does appear to have obtained some 
material because a letter a week later from Mallie to James asks: “Did 
you get the papers on speeches your papa sent you?”65  It is clear from 
this correspondence that Harlan did not have information about the topic 
in his own possession and that he had time neither to research nor to 
reflect much on what he wrote. 
Third, turning to the content of Harlan’s letter, the first thing one 
may notice is that the arguments he offered were not well fleshed-out.  
They were lightly sketched and superficial, exhibiting neither the 
refinement of thought nor the logical arrangement that one would expect 
from someone with Harlan’s intellectual depth and eloquence.  Rather, 
the ideas were offered almost in stream-of-consciousness.  This may 
suggest he had no more than the kind of superficial familiarity with the 
issue that any person aware of public affairs would have had.  The 
 
62. Letter from John Marshall Harlan to James Shanklin Harlan (Jan. 7, 1883), in 
HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at reel 1, frame 286. 
63. Letter from Malvina Shanklin Harlan to James Shanklin Harlan (Jan. 20, 1883), in 
HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at reel 1, frame 294-95.  The letter from James to his 
father is not preserved in the HARLAN PAPERS, LC.  That year, January 20, 1883 was a 
Saturday, so Harlan’s response was written on Sunday.  Since Harlan, a devout Old School 
Presbyterian, kept a traditional Sabbath on Sundays, it is unlikely he did any research that day 
before replying to James’ letter. 
64. Letter from John Marshall Harlan to James Shanklin Harlan (Jan. 21, 1883), in 
HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at reel 1, frame 296. 
65. Letter from Malvina Shanklin Harlan to James Shanklin Harlan (Jan. 29, 1883), in 
HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at reel 1, frame 299-300.  The “papers” to which Mallie 
refers may have been newspaper accounts of the Congressional debates; or perhaps Harlan 
sent James copies of the Congressional Debates of the preceding February and March. 
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particular ideas themselves, as presented, do not so much address the 
unique questions posed by Chinese immigration as touch general nativist 
ideas that Harlan already entertained.  They suggest the reasons he seems 
to have favored immigration restriction generally.66 
It also seems peculiar that Harlan began his letter by referring his 
son to the speeches of Senators Miller and Jones because he 
“suppos[ed]” they would provide “all the facts you need” while 
acknowledging “I do not know what they said[!]”67  All of this suggests 
that, in his scramble to reply to James, Harlan might have sought advice 
from someone more knowledgeable about the issues surrounding 
Chinese immigration than he was himself.  If Harlan had known more 
himself about the details of the Congressional debates, he likely would 
have referred his son to more balanced sources.68 
The sources of information about the Chinese available to Harlan 
on a Saturday, when he was (according to Mallie’s letter) “busy in 
court,” were limited.  Unlike with Black Americans, he had no direct 
personal experience with Chinese people to disabuse him of stereotypes.  
Harlan might have had quick access to the Report of the Congressional 
Special Committee on Chinese Immigration published in February, 
1877.69  Despite publishing 1,200 pages of testimony that painted a 
 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65. 
67. Senators John Franklin Miller (R-California) and John Percival Jones (R-Nevada) 
both supported exclusion.  Miller had introduced the Chinese Exclusion bill in the Senate and 
took the lead, on behalf of the exclusionists, in the 1882 Senate debate.  Miller “is chiefly 
known for the active part he took in the anti-Chinese legislation . . . .”  6 pt. 2 DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHIES 631 (Dumas Malone, ed., 1933).  Jones supported him.  The 
speeches of both Miller and Jones were, in fact, laced with racist rhetoric.  If Harlan had 
followed the 1882 senate debate, he could not have missed the obvious link between the racist 
arguments offered against the Chinese and the same arguments his southern contemporaries 
made against Black equality.  See GYORY, supra note 14, at 228-230; see also McClain, supra 
note 14, at 81 (for a discussion of the role Miller played in the state convention of 1880-81).  
The entire debate is set out at 13 CONG. REC. S1481-1488, 1515-1523, 1545-1550, 1581-1591, 
1634-1646, 1667-1675, 1702-1717, 1738-1754 (Feb. 28, Mar. 1-3, 6-9, 1882). 
68. Harlan might have consulted his friend, Senator George F. Hoar (R-Massachusetts), 
who, in the same debates, attacked Chinese exclusion.  Hoar had been Miller’s leading 
opponent in the debate over the 1882 Act.  See Nestor of the High Bench, WASH. POST, Apr. 
16, 1905.  Unfortunately, James’ letter requesting his father’s help apparently has not 
survived, as I have been unable to locate it in the Harlan Papers.  It is possible that James 
requested only material against Chinese immigration; that he was to argue only in favor of 
Chinese exclusion, or that his father offered arguments on the other side in separate, lost, 
correspondence.  One cannot construct an argument on what is missing from the historical 
record, but neither should one put too much emphasis on one isolated letter when we know so 
little about the context in which it was written. 
69. S. REP. NO. 689 (1877).  For a careful critical analysis of the Senate report, see 
COOLIDGE, supra note 14, at 96-108.  If Harlan were familiar with the Report, it seems likely 
he would have made reference to it for use in debate preparation in his letter to James.  The 
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mixed picture of benefits and burdens, the six-page Committee Report 
pointed only to the problems caused by Chinese immigration and did so 
in strikingly racist language.  The Report emphasized the refusal of the 
Chinese to assimilate with white Americans and the threat Chinese 
laborers posed to white labor, alleging the Chinese would “work for 
wages which [would] not support white men and especially white 
families . . . .”70  Even more emphatically, the Committee expressed its 
fear for the preservation of republican institutions and white civilization 
wherever the Chinese settled in large numbers. 
[T]he safety of republican institutions requires that the exercise of 
the franchise shall be only by those who have a love and appreciation 
for our institutions, and this rule excludes the great mass of the 
Chinese from the ballot as a necessary means to public safety . . . .  
An indigestible mass in the community, distinct in language, pagan 
in religion, inferior in mental and moral qualities, . . . is an 
undesirable element in a republic, but becomes especially so if 
political power is placed in its hands.71 
The Chinese, in the view of the committee, threatened the American 
future of the West coast. 
[T]he Pacific coast must in time become either American or 
Mongolian.  There is a vast hive from which Chinese immigrants 
may swarm, and circumstances may send them in enormous numbers 
to this country.  These two forces, Mongolian and American, are 
already in active opposition.  They do not amalgamate, and all 
conditions are opposed to any assimilation.  The American race is 
progressive and in favor of a responsible representative government.  
The Mongolian race seems to have no desire for progress, and to 
have no conception of representative and free institutions. . . .  [T]he 
Chinese, having no inclination to adopt this country as their 
permanent home, . . . come and return as pagans, having a total 
disregard for our Government and laws . . . .72 
A similar legislative report was published by the Senate of 
California in August, 1877.  Entitled Chinese Immigration: Its Social, 
Moral and Political Effect,73 it was even more racist in tone than the 
 
letter contains no such reference.  The House Select Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization made another report on Chinese Immigration in 1891, making similar 
allegations and adding new ones.  See H.R. REP. NO. 4048 (1891). 
70. Kim, supra note 15, at 59. 
71. S. REP. NO. 689, at v (1877) (emphasis added). 
72. Id. at v-vi. 
73. REP. TO THE CAL. STATE S. OF ITS SPEC. COMM. ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION, 
CHINESE IMMIGRATION; ITS SOCIAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL EFFECT (1878), available at 
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Congressional Report.  The state report alleged that the Chinese 
committed perjury freely, and ran their own shadow tribunals, “in open 
defiance of [our laws, creating] an imperium in imperio.”  It also asserted 
that “[s]ervile labor to them is their natural and inevitable lot.” 
[T]here can be no hope that any contact with our people, however 
long continued, will ever conform them to our institutions, enable 
them to comprehend or appreciate our form of government, or to 
assume the duties or discharge the functions of citizens.  During their 
entire settlement in California they have never adapted themselves to 
our habits, modes of dress, or our educational system, have never 
learned the sanctity of an oath, never desired to become citizens, or 
to perform the duties of citizenship, never discovered the difference 
between right and wrong, never ceased the worship of their idol 
gods, or advanced a step beyond the musty traditions of their native 
hive.  Impregnable to all the influences of our Anglo-Saxon life, they 
remain the same stolid Asiatics that have floated on the rivers and 
slaved in the fields of China for thirty centuries . . . .74 
If Harlan had access to these reports, it is noteworthy that, unlike 
the reports, Harlan’s letter to James does not argue that the indelible 
character of the Chinese or their racial inferiority required that they be 
denied admission to the American community.75  Instead, Harlan’s letter 
suggests, it is Chinese resistance to American political culture and 
institutions, their refusal to fully identify with and accept the culture of 
the United States, rather than their inherent racial characteristics that 
made Chinese immigration problematic.  This may seem a subtle 
distinction, but it is an important one. 
In January 1883, the Supreme Court had not yet heard a case 
involving the Chinese but one of Harlan’s colleagues on the Court 
already had had substantial experience with the question of Chinese 
 
http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/4226138?n=3&s=4.  For a discussion of the context of the 
California Report, see COOLIDGE, supra note 14.  For a critical analysis of the Report itself, 
see Id. at 83-95.  Coolidge notes that the California legislature sent out 10,000 copies of the 
report to politicians, newspapers, and other influentials.  Id. at 84.  Harlan may have received 
one of them.  The New York Times later reported that Dr. Coolidge had written a book that 
was so critical of immigration officials and other actors in the Chinese exclusion drama that 
“Henry Holt & Co., the publishers, [had] withdrawn it from circulation” under pressure from 
Washington.”  Officials Attacked; Book is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1909. 
74. REP. TO THE CAL. STATE S. OF ITS SPEC. COMM. ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION, 
CHINESE IMMIGRATION; ITS SOCIAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL EFFECT (1878), available at 
http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/4226138?. 
75. Opposition to Chinese immigration was not always grounded in a belief in their 
racial inferiority.  Some opponents “regarded the Chinese as equals.  The issue was simply 
one of who would control California.”  WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 101 (1988). 
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immigration.  Justice Field, a Californian, had been involved in 
Democratic politics in the state and his work there as federal circuit 
judge had immersed him in the “Chinese problem.”  In Harlan’s eyes, 
Field would have seemed an expert on the issues involved.  If seeking 
hurried advice on a Saturday at Court about what arguments and sources 
to send to James, Harlan might well have spoken with Justice Field.  
Field’s discussion of the problems caused by Chinese immigration and 
the “facts” that he offered about the Chinese themselves, only slightly 
more than a year later in his dissent in Chew Heong v. United States,76 
bear a clear resemblance to the “facts” assumed about the Chinese in 
Harlan’s letter.  Field later repeated them in his opinion for the Court in 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States.77  Field would have been familiar with 
both the congressional and the state senate reports on Chinese 
immigration and may have communicated their themes to Harlan.  
Harlan’s letter seems a somewhat confused echo of these arguments.  It 
reads like he remembered the bullet points, but not the details of what 
Field had told him about the “facts” surrounding the Chinese question.78  
It is quite possible that Harlan’s letter to James demonstrates not 
 
76. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).  In Chew Heong, Field argued that Chinese labor competed 
unfairly with White labor because the Chinese, without families, were “content with small 
gains and the simplest fare” and “perfectly satisfied with what would hardly furnish a scanty 
subsistence to our laborers and artisans.”  Id. at 566.  He went on to observe that: 
[N]otwithstanding [the] favorable provisions [of the treaties], opening the whole of 
our country to them, . . . they have remained among us a separate people, retaining 
their original peculiarities of dress, manners, habits, and modes of living, which are 
as marked as their complexion and language.  They live by themselves; they 
constitute a distinct organization with the laws and customs which they brought 
from China.  Our institutions have made no impression on them during the more 
than 30 years they have been in the country. . . .  They do not and will not assimilate 
with our people . . . .  Thoughtful persons who were exempt from race prejudices 
saw, in the facilities of transportation between [China and the West Coast] the 
certainty, at no distant day, that from the unnumbered millions on the opposite 
shores of the Pacific, vast hordes would pour in upon us, overrunning our coast and 
controlling its institutions.  A restriction upon their further immigration was felt to 
be necessary to prevent the degradation of white labor, and to preserve to ourselves 
the inestimable benefits of our Christian civilization. 
Id. at 566-67, 569.  In Chew Heong, only slightly over a year after Harlan’s letter, Field sets 
out the “facts” about the Chinese, with far more articulation and vehemence than Harlan did in 
his letter to James.  See Letter, supra note 62, but without Harlan’s hoary nativist themes.  The 
parallel is striking.  It is also striking that Harlan seems curiously unmoved by Field’s “facts” 
in Chew Heong.   
77. 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). 
78. For the role Justice Field played in the Chinese cases, see MCCLAIN, supra note 14, 
and CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 205-239 (Phoenix 
1969) (1930).  For Field’s privately expressed views on Chinese immigration, see Charles W. 
McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and the American Judicial Tradition, in THE FIELDS AND THE 
LAW 5, 17 (1986). 
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prejudice but a lack of knowledge about the subject, and dependence on 
Field’s exposition of the issue.  Since the Court was in session, Field and 
Harlan could easily have had a conversation about Chinese immigration 
and such a conversation might well have been his source for the 
arguments he sent James. 
The substance of the letter is a peculiar blend of Field’s “facts” 
filtered through Harlan’s own nativist concerns about immigration in 
general.79  Harlan began with the metaphor of the family.  One owed a 
greater duty to one’s household than to strangers.  He then went on to 
describe why the Chinese were strangers: they were of a different race 
and culture.  The reference to the Chinese as another race “as distinct 
from ours as ours is from the negro” was a comment on “foreign-ness” 
not inferiority.  His hypothetical about “a tide setting in here from 
America [sic] [Africa] of uneducated African savages” expresses the 
same fear.  For Harlan, the champion of Black American citizenship and 
equal rights, a “tide” of any people whose arrival might swamp what was 
distinctively American, elicited a nativist response. 
Harlan suggested that James offer a standard for immigration 
decisions, a criterion for when the stranger should be admitted to the 
household, the immigrant to the country.  Harlan suggested that James 
argue that decisions concerning immigration should be resolved in 
reference to what was good for the United States, rather than what was 
good for the immigrant.  This idea was uncontroversial in the 1880s and 
remains among the important criteria upon which immigration policy is 
based today. 
Briefly, in the mid-1850s, Harlan had been a member of the 
nativist, anti-Catholic, American Party.  That Party was the political 
expression of the “Know-Nothing” movement and appealed to 
conservative Protestants like Harlan trapped geographically between the 
North and South in the sections’ great argument over slavery.80  Later, 
Harlan seems to have rejected the explicitly anti-Catholic sentiments of 
the Party and, near the end of his life, wrote that he regretted he had ever 
 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65. 
80. Initiates of the secret “Order of the Star-Spangled Banner,” were known publicly as 
the Know-Nothings because when asked about the secret society they responded: “I know 
nothing about it.”  Members swore to vote only for native-born Americans, were “in favor of 
Americans ruling America”, and against any Catholic.  DARRELL OVERDYKE, THE KNOW-
NOTHING PARTY IN THE SOUTH 34, 40 (1950); see also TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND 
SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1850S (1992).  For 
more detail on the religious elements of Harlan’s nativism, see Gordon, supra note 12, at 353-
358, 391-395.  For recent scholarship on nativism, see ANBINDER, supra note 30, at 177-201. 
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been part of that group.81  Still, in 1889, he persisted in the belief that the 
Democratic Party “pandered to and courted foreign influence, in order to 
get the votes of foreigners.”82  While claiming to welcome “honest, 
industrious, immigrants who desire to enjoy the blessings of our 
institutions, and who assimilate with our people,” Harlan argued that too 
many who came here were “worthless characters,” criminals, and those 
“gathered from the highways and byways of other countries.”83  These 
immigrants threatened the United States because they “have little 
sympathy with or knowledge of our institutions.”84  He apparently 
continued to fear that “the safety of our Government and the integrity of 
our civilization [are] . . . menaced by the presence here of so many 
who . . . have little sympathy with or knowledge of our institutions.”85 
Harlan returned to these themes in 1898.  Too many people were 
admitted to citizenship “who have not the slightest idea about our 
institutions, who scarcely know our language, whose habits have been 
formed up and past [sic] manhood in other lands, under other systems of 
government, and who never do understand our civilization as we 
understand it.”86  The debate letter suggests these themes and so may 
reflect Harlan’s general ideas about immigration.  It is noteworthy that 
Harlan seems never, publicly, to have connected his immigration ideas to 
the race of the immigrants.  There is nothing, therefore, to suggest that 
his animus, if it existed, was the result of race prejudice particularly 
directed at the Chinese.87 
 
81. John Marshall Harlan, The Know-Nothing Organization, in HARLAN PAPERS, LC, 
supra note 3, at reel 8, frame 377.  Harlan’s anxieties about the Chinese, if he had them, might 
have been reinforced by his dedication to the Union and his experiences during the sectional 
crisis of the 1850s and the Civil War.  If people with no loyalty to the Union became dominant 
in a geographic section of the country, might they not become a centrifugal force, at some 
future time, threatening the integrity of the Union?  The experience of Mexico whose citizens 
had originally settled Texas, the American southwest, and California, only to be overwhelmed 
by Anglo immigrants from the United States, was a warning against welcoming an 
“unassimilable” mass to a particular geographic area.  Harlan apparently harbored such fears 
about the Mormons.  See Gordon, supra note 12, at 402-18. 
82. John Marshall Harlan, Speech delivered in Chicago (1889), quoted in A General 
Celebration, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1889. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Harlan, Law Lectures (Jan. 8, 1898), in HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at 13, 
reel 8, frame 509. 
87. The only public speech of which I am aware in which Harlan made reference to race 
in relation to Asians was a speech he gave to the Navy League banquet in Washington, D.C. 
on January 11, 1908.  No text of this speech survives but in it, as reported by the Washington 
Post and New York Times, Harlan supported large expenditures for the navy and warned of a 
future collision with Japan.  Harlan Warns of War, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1908.  In this 
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There is no doubt that Harlan esteemed American culture and 
preferred it to the competing cultures that immigrants, whatever their 
race, brought with them to the United States.  Ironically, Harlan believed 
in the defense of American culture in the name of equality, not in 
opposition to it.88  Harlan favored immigration restriction in order to 
preserve America’s political culture, not its racial purity.  He applied 
this same standard to immigration by Europeans.  In this respect, when 
Harlan asserted in his letter to James that “[o]nly Americans, or those 
who become such, by long stay her, understand American institutions,” 
he was really only saying what his membership in the American 
(“Know-Nothing”) Party had already said in the late 1850s.  That short-
lived party’s watchword had been “[p]ut none but Americans (native-
 
speech, as reported, Harlan predicted a possible future war with Japan, perhaps triggered by 
conflict over China.   
Just across the water there is a country with an immense population, whose 
commerce we are seeking [China].  We refer to the people of Asia as the yellow 
race.  There are 400,000,000 Chinese, as strong physically and mentally as we are.  
[Japan’s] people are progressive and ambitious.  We may some day see a skilled 
army in Japan of from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000. . . .  [Japan may someday say] 
‘[t]his [China] is ours.  Get out!’  I don’t think they have any such idea now, and we 
have no hostility toward them.  But there will be a conflict between the yellow race 
and the white race that will shake the earth.  When it comes I want to see this 
country with a navy on both oceans that will be strong enough. 
Harlan Prophecies a Great Race War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1908.  With the annexation of 
Hawaii and the acquisition of the Philippines and Guam from Spain in 1898, the United States 
became a power in the central and western Pacific.  The stunning Japanese victory over Russia 
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 had demonstrated both Japan’s capability and desire to 
project power in the western Pacific.  Given China’s weakness and its proximity to Japan, it 
was natural for Japan to think of China as within its sphere of influence and, eventually, to 
seek to exclude other powers which had commercial footholds there.  One did not have to be a 
prophet to foresee a future collision between American and Japanese interests that might 
trigger a war.  In fact, when the war came in 1941, it was partly triggered by Japanese 
occupation of China.  It is noteworthy that, in his speech, Harlan neither expressed nor implied 
a belief in Asian inferiority.  Instead, he saw the Japanese as dangerous competitors.  At the 
time of this speech, there were many sources of friction between the United States and Japan.  
At the very time Harlan spoke to the Navy League, the country was on edge with widespread 
anxiety about a Pacific war.  In late 1907, President Roosevelt ordered America’s battleships 
into the Pacific, partly to pressure Japan into resolving the countries’ differences 
diplomatically.  See EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 482-85, 492-95, 534 (2001).  In 
December and January, 1907-08, the newspapers ran a number of stories about the threat of 
war between the U.S. and Japan.  See e.g., A Stronghold Needed in the Philippines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1908 (Magazine), at 2-3; Paris Thinks It War Move.; Compares Our Fleet 
with Japan’s —In Japan’s Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1907; War Talk In Paris. – Suggested 
Japan Asks Agreement with US Before Fleet Reaches Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1908.  The 
day after Harlan’s speech, the New York Times reported that the newly appointed Japanese 
ambassador to the United States, Baron Kogoro Takahira, was hurrying to the United States 
for talks.  N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1908.  By November, 1908, all matters were adjusted 
(temporarily) in the Root–Takahira Agreement. 
88. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 10, at 122. 
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born Protestants) on Guard.”89 
In this context, the most damning words of Harlan’s letter cease to 
be an attack on the Chinese as a race and restate Harlan’s general 
aversion to unskilled immigrants, who undermined American political 
and cultural homogeneity.90  These old familiar nativist themes, which 
Harlan also expressed in other contexts and at other venues, were not 
really about race at all.91  But, once immigrants entered the country, 
defense of American culture and institutions, as he understood them, 
required Harlan to insist that these same immigrants receive the 
constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, and property belonging to all 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.92 
Even if one reads all of this differently, one thing is clear from the 
letter itself and that is that the Chinese, like every other immigrant and 
racial group for Harlan, were entitled to the full rights of citizenship, 
including suffrage, once they ceased to be sojourners and joined their 
destiny to that of the country.  If forced to choose between fidelity to the 
principle of constitutional republicanism, with its corollary of equality 
before the law for all members of the community, and creating classes of 
citizenship, Harlan remained committed to equality.  He may not have 
liked the prospect, but still he wrote: “If they come we must admit them 
 
89. John Marshall Harlan, Memorandum on the Know Nothing Party in Kentucky, in 
HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, at reel 8, frame 377. 
90. These immigrants undermined American Protestant culture by their perceived 
affinity for alcohol and the saloon, for the strange and dangerous political ideas some of them 
brought (like anarchism and socialism), and by their rejection of the Protestant Sabbath.  See 
Gordon, supra note 12, at 346, 350-53. 
91. That Harlan would have rejected the racist element in the argument is suggested by 
his dissent in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).  In the Berea College case, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals sustained a state segregation statute enacted for the specific 
purpose of preventing Berea College from continuing its policy of teaching Black and whites 
students together at an integrated, coeducational, private college.  In its opinion, the Kentucky 
court set out in great detail the racial ideas then current in much of the South and among those 
who might be labeled “racial Darwinists.”  Berea College v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 623 
(Ky 1906).  On review by the United States Supreme Court, the majority sustained the state 
court ruling, without addressing the state court’s “racial Darwinist” arguments.  In his dissent, 
Harlan rejected the reasoning of the court below when he wrote:  
Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race than an American 
government, professedly based on the principles of freedom, and charged with the 
protection of all citizens alike, can make distinctions between such citizens in the 
matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes, simply because of their 
respective races?   
Berea College, 211 U.S. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
92. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 375 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Dorr v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 
197, 226 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
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to citizenship, then to suffrage.”  Even given Harlan’s nativist history 
and concerns, it is still clear that Harlan’s commitment to equality for all 
Americans, once here, was fundamental.93 
For Harlan, there could never again be a class of persons in the 
United States, as Chief Justice Taney had asserted in Dred Scott, with 
only such rights as the dominant race chose to give them.  That was part 
of the curse of slavery and that monster had been slain.  It is possible that 
Harlan’s first choice was limitation of Chinese immigration, but it is 
important to acknowledge that he assumed that equal treatment must 
accompany admission.  Later, when the Insular Cases presented this 
question, Harlan cast his vote repeatedly for this position and wrote 
powerful dissents making his meaning perfectly clear.94 
III.   THE CHINESE CASES 
A.   A Framework for the Cases 
Thirty-seven cases involving the rights of Asians in the United 
States came to the Supreme Court during Harlan’s tenure.  They fell into 
five broad categories.  The first category asked whether Congress could 
forbid Chinese immigration to the United States.95  These cases required 
the Court to define the scope of Congress’ power over immigration.  The 
second category involved the application of the Exclusion regime to 
those Chinese who sought readmission to the United States, after 
traveling abroad, claiming to have been resident in this country before 
the effective date of the Exclusion Acts.96  Connected with this set of 
cases were two subsidiary questions asking whether Congress could 
delegate authority to administrative officials to make the factual 
determinations involved when they applied the Exclusion regime to 
individual cases and, if it could, whether Congress could deny the 
federal courts the power to review these determinations.97  The third 
category of cases asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
 
93. Even the exclusion regime was temporary, Harlan suggested.  It would provide “the 
opportunity to test the question whether it is safe to . . . permit unrestricted immigration.”  He 
wrote, “[t]he Chinese here will, in that time, show of what stuff they are made.”  Letter, 
HARLAN PAPERS, LC, supra note 3, reel 1, frame 296-98 (the entire text of this letter is set out 
supra note 61). 
94. See infra Part IV. 
95. E.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
96. E.g., Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
97. E.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); see also Yamataya v. 
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
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Protection Clause protected resident non-citizens against discriminatory 
state and local laws or laws, which, though neutral on their face, were 
administered in a discriminatory manner.98  The fourth category of cases 
asked whether federal civil rights statutes protected resident non-citizens 
in their persons and property from the violent acts of their neighbors.99 
A fifth question that arose but was only presented to the Court on 
one occasion asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment bestowed 
citizenship on children born in the United States to resident non-citizen 
Chinese parents who themselves could not become citizens.100 
Twenty-eight of the thirty-seven cases involved immigration.  
Harlan participated in twenty-seven of these and wrote opinions in five 
of them: four for the Court and one in dissent.101  One striking fact about 
the cases is that Harlan wrote few of the opinions.  This means that the 
revisionist critique relies heavily on assigning meaning to his naked 
votes in the face of his silence.102 
B.   Harlan and the Chinese Immigration Cases 
The Court decided the first case involving the Chinese Exclusion 
Acts in December, 1884.103  Chew Heong, a Chinese laborer, had entered 
the United States and become a resident under the provisions of the 
Burlingame Treaty of 1868 before passage of the Exclusion Acts.  He 
left the United States in 1881, lived in Hawaii until 1884, and then 
sought to return to California.  He was denied entry under the 1882 and 
 
98. E.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 
(1885); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
99. E.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887). 
100. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
101. Harlan’s opinions for the Court were: Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); 
United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 
538 (1895); and Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).  The dissent was Jung Ah 
Lung v. United States, 124 U.S. 621 (1888). 
102. This is sometimes unavoidable but when one does this, he or she should remember 
he or she is staring into the darkness, guessing at what is out there.  Even when a judge writes 
an appellate opinion, the offered rationale likely reflects negotiation and compromise rather 
than one judge’s unalloyed views.  Alternatively, the opinion may offer nothing more than that 
judge’s explanation of why he or she feels compelled, perhaps even against his or her private 
preferences, to a result required by law.  Once a principle of law is settled, stare decisis urges 
the judge to apply that rule to other similar cases.  The problem is even more complicated 
when one judge joins in another’s opinion.  Joining an opinion may indicate complete 
agreement.  It may mean there was insufficient disagreement to warrant a separate, written 
expression of that disagreement.  It may mean that the judge is distracted by other work or has 
joined an opinion for tactical reasons, so as to have the opportunity to shape how “bad” the 
ultimate published rationale becomes.  One should be cautious in drawing conclusions from 
silence about a particular judge’s beliefs. 
103. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
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1884 Exclusion Acts because he could not produce the certificate for re-
entry required by the Exclusion Acts.104  Harlan, writing for the majority 
of a divided court, ordered that Chew Heong be allowed to re-enter the 
country.  Justice Field, who had sat as a circuit judge in the case and had 
rejected Chew Heong’s petition below, dissented.105 
Borrowing heavily from Judge Sawyer’s dissent in the circuit court, 
Harlan attempted to reconcile the pre-existing treaty rights of the 
Chinese with the Exclusion Acts of 1882 and 1884.  Harlan rejected the 
government’s argument that the Exclusion Acts abrogated the treaty by 
inconsistency.  While acknowledging that Congress could abrogate a 
treaty by subsequently enacting a statute that was inconsistent with it, 
Harlan argued that since the Exclusion Acts had declared Congress’ 
intent to execute the treaty rather than to revoke it, the rule of 
construction that applied dictated that repeals by implication are 
disfavored.  Therefore, the Court should attempt to reconcile the statutes 
and the treaty if possible.106  By so construing congressional intent, 
Harlan upheld Chinese treaty rights while preserving the principle of 
judicial deference for congressional authority. 
Harlan argued further that Congress could not have intended the re-
entry of Chinese laborers, resident in the United States before passage of 
the statutes but abroad when the Exclusion Acts were passed, to depend 
on a condition that it was impossible for them to satisfy.  Since the 
statutes requiring the certificate for re-entry were passed after Chew 
Heong left the country, it was impossible for him to comply with a 
requirement that did not exist when he left.107  Harlan’s “impossibility” 
 
104. The facts were stipulated and so the case presented the question of the legal 
application of the Exclusion Acts without raising issues related to fact-finding. 
105. Justice Field had written a short opinion below, despite a long and well-reasoned 
dissent by his circuit court colleague Judge Lorenzo Sawyer arguing that the Exclusion Act 
certificate requirement did not apply to Chew Heong.  See In re Cheen Heong, 21 F. 791 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1884). 
106. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 549-50. 
107. Id. at 554-55.  Judge Sawyer had relied heavily on this proposition and by parsing 
the statute carefully, offered Harlan a way to reconcile this reading with the literal language of 
the text.  Harlan also used Sawyer’s argument that since the re-entry certificates required by 
the 1882 and 1884 Acts differed in their requirements, retroactive application of the 1884 
Act’s provision making “this certificate” (the one prescribed in the 1884 statute) the only 
acceptable proof of prior residence would have the effect of excluding persons seeking re-
entry with an 1882 certificate.  In re Cheen Heong, 21 F. at 804-06 (Sawyer, J., dissenting).  
Harlan and the majority in Chew Heong may also have given weight to Sawyer’s final 
argument.  Near the end of his opinion, Judge Sawyer wrote:  
The construction I have given to this law not only reconciles the legislation with the 
observance of the plighted faith of the nation, but it carries out and effectuates the 
object of the treaty and the law.  The evil to be remedied was the continued, 
unrestricted immigration of Chinese laborers.  It was recognized that rights of those 
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theory further limited the reach of the statutes and would be used by the 
Court in future Chinese cases to prevent the exclusion of other Chinese 
petitioners.108  Finally, Harlan rejected the argument that the language of 
the 1884 Act, which made the certificate “the only evidence permissible” 
to establish a Chinese resident’s right to re-enter the United States, 
should be applied retroactively to Chinese who were abroad before 
passage of the act.  Although conceding that Congress could give 
retroactive effect to a statute of this kind, Harlan argued that this should 
occur only when Congress used “language so clear and positive as to 
leave no room for doubt that such was the intention . . . .”109  This 
principle restricted the reach of the Exclusion Acts and made it possible 
for Chinese laborers like Chew Heong, who would otherwise have been 
excluded, to re-enter the country.  Harlan tried to restrict application of 
the Exclusion Statutes to those situations to which Congress reasonably 
had intended them to apply, but he also made it clear that, if Congress 
expressed in unequivocal language its intention to exclude the Chinese, 
he would defer to congressional power.  Thus, Harlan insisted that 
Chinese rights, established by treaty, be taken seriously while 
acknowledging the broad scope of congressional power over 
immigration. 
The substance of Justice Field’s dissent makes it clear that Harlan 
and the Court could have taken a different path.  In Field’s view, 
Harlan’s reading of the Exclusion Acts, permitting any Chinese laborer 
who had ever been resident in the United States before passage of the 
Exclusion Acts (including those who had abandoned their American 
 
who were already here were secured by the Burlingame treaty and international 
law. . . .  [T]he legislation was directed solely against any further addition to the 
numbers of the Chinese then here . . . .  This object, the law in its practical 
operation, has been attained.  Not only has there been no accession to the number of 
Chinese in this country, but the statistics of the custom-house show that, during the 
28 months which have elapsed since the passage, the number of departures exceed 
the number of arrivals by 12,000. 
Id. at 807-08.  On this basis, Harlan might have reconciled his nativist fear that American 
culture and institutions on the West Coast would be swamped by an unlimited “tide” of 
Chinese immigrants, with his desire for neutrality on matters involving race-based 
distinctions. 
108. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 549.  Chief Justice Fuller would later use this language 
to justify common sense exceptions to the Act in favor of some Chinese merchants.  The 
Court held that Chinese merchants, who resided in the United States and complied with the 
Treasury Department regulations before leaving for visits to China, must be allowed to return 
to the United States.  See Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 62 (1892).  Justice 
Brewer also used Harlan’s opinion in Chew Heong to a similar purpose in United States v. 
Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 465 (1900). 
109. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 559. 
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residence) to return, was tantamount to nullifying the statutes.110  After a 
screed against Chinese immigration,111 Field gave reasons why the 
United States was free, without dishonor, to abrogate the Burlingame 
Treaty.112  He reported that the courts of the Pacific coast, under the 
1882 Act, had been choked with cases in which Chinese laborers evaded 
enforcement of the Exclusion Act by producing Chinese witnesses who 
would swear, falsely, that the petitioner had been resident in the country 
before passage of the 1882 Act.  Quoting from the House committee 
report on the 1884 Act, Field stated that Congress had made the 
certificate the only permissible evidence of a Chinese laborer’s right to 
re-enter the country in order to prevent this.  By this provision, Field 
argued, “the door is effectually closed, or would be closed but for the 
decision of the court in this case, to all parol evidence, and the perjuries 
which have heretofore characterized its reception.”113  In light of the 
majority’s decision in Chew Heong, Field predicted that: 
[O]ur courts there will be crowded with applicants to land, who 
never before saw our shores, and yet will produce a multitude of 
witnesses to establish their former residence . . . .  I can only express 
the hope, in view of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing 
the exclusion of Chinese laborers intended by the act, if parol 
testimony from them is receivable, that congress will, . . . speak on 
the subject in terms which will admit of no doubt as to their 
meaning.114 
Rejecting Harlan’s “impossibility” principle, Field argued, 
Congress had intentionally excluded any Chinese laborer who had, in 
fact, been resident in the United States before the 1882 Act, in order to 
keep out those who, though never resident in the United States, would 
 
110. Id. at 561-62, 572 (Field, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 565-69. 
112. Id. at 570. 
113. Id. at 577-78. 
114. Id. at 578-79.  In Chae Chan Ping, Field would repeat the allegation that the 
Chinese Exclusion Acts were amended to require evidence of prior residence other than the 
testimony of Chinese witnesses because of the common belief that the Chinese would readily 
perjure themselves.  He suggested that the Chinese had “loose notions . . . of the obligation of 
an oath.”  Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 591, 598 (1889).  Justice Gray would 
return to this theme in Fong Yue Ting to justify the requirement of the Geary Act that proof of 
prior residence must be by at least one white witness.  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 730 (1893).  In his dissent in Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891), 
Justice Brewer explicitly rejected this idea, writing: “The government evidently rested on the 
assumption that because the witnesses were Chinese persons they were not to be believed.  I 
do not agree with this.”  Id. at 422 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
JAMES W. GORDON  
318 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:287 
falsely claim they had been in order to gain entry.115  This decision, he 
believed, was within the power of Congress and he argued that the courts 
had no authority to overturn it.116 
Having conceded that Congress could abrogate a treaty by 
legislation, all Harlan would have had to do in order to join Field and 
slam the door on such claims was to hold that Congress had intended, as 
Field so passionately argued, to abrogate the treaty and apply the 
certificate requirement retroactively.  By choosing otherwise, Harlan 
made it possible for many Chinese who would otherwise have been 
excluded, to enter the United States.  This was a strangely pro-Chinese 
beginning for a man alleged to have a particular racial animus toward 
them. 
In 1888, when a case involving Chinese exclusion next came to the 
Court, Harlan dissented.  The case was Jung Ah Lung v. United States.117  
A Chinese laborer, resident in the country before passage of the 
Exclusion Acts, had complied with these acts by obtaining the requisite 
certificate before leaving, in 1883, for a trip to China.118  In 1885, upon 
return to the United States, he was denied re-entry because he could not 
produce the certificate.  The petitioner claimed the certificate was stolen 
from him by pirates but the customs officials refused him admission on 
the ground that the 1884 Act made the certificate the only admissible 
evidence of his right to return.119 
Closely parsing the language of the 1882 Act, Justice Blatchford, 
writing for the majority, held that the 1882 Act, (which applied to Jung 
Ah Lung because he had left the country before passage of the 1884 
Act), did not make the certificate the sole evidence of his right to re-
enter when the petitioner sought re-entry by sea.  In reaching this result, 
the Court held that Congress had intended to make the certificate the sole 
evidence permissible when entry was by land but only evidence of the 
petitioner’s identity when he sought re-entry by sea.  This reading was 
grounded on a difference in language between section 4 (applying to 
those returning by sea) and section 12 (applying to those returning by 
land).  Section 12 said: “[N]o Chinese person shall be permitted to enter 
the United States by land without producing to the proper officer of 
 
115. Quock Ting, 140 U.S. at 148. 
116. Justice Bradley also dissented, agreeing that Congress had intended to allow re-
entry only upon production of a certificate of identification.  Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 578-80 
(Bradley, J., dissenting). 
117. 124 U.S. 621 (1888). 
118. Id. at 624. 
119. Id. 
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customs the certificate in this act required of Chinese persons seeking to 
land from a vessel.”120  Section 4 said: “The certificate herein provided 
for shall entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return 
to and re-enter the United States, upon producing and delivering the 
same to the collector of customs of the district at which such Chinese 
laborer shall seek to re-enter.”121  Justice Blatchford argued this language  
merely says that [the certificate] . . . shall be given for the purpose of 
properly identifying the laborer, and shall be proper evidence of his 
right to . . . re-enter the United States . . . .  It does not say that the 
Chinese laborer returning by a vessel shall not be permitted to 
enter . . . without producing the certificate.122 
This reasoning was too disingenuous for Harlan.  In his dissent he 
argued that the Court had ignored the language of section 3, which 
exempted laborers who were resident in the country before passage of 
the 1882 Act or who arrived within 90 days thereafter  
and who shall produce to such master before going on board such 
vessel, and shall produce to the collector of the port in the United 
States at which such vessel shall arrive, the evidence hereinafter in 
this act required of his being one of the laborers in this section 
mentioned.123   
Section 4 said: 
The certificate herein provided for shall entitle the Chinese laborer to 
whom the same is issued to return to and re-enter the United States 
upon producing and delivering the same to the collector of customs 
of the district at which such Chinese laborer shall seek to re-enter, 
and, upon delivery of such certificate by such Chinese laborer to the 
collector of customs at the time of re-entry into the United States, 
said collector shall cause the same to be filed in the custom-house, 
and duly canceled.124 
Harlan stated he could reach no other conclusion from the language 
than that Congress had intended “to prohibit the return to this country of 
 
120. Id. at 632. 
121. Id. at 634. 
122. Id. at 634-35.  The United States also contended that Congress had provided that 
customs officials were to determine whether the petitioner could re-enter the United States and 
that this decision was not subject to court review.  The majority rejected this argument as well, 
though it would embrace it three years later in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 
660 (1891). 
123. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. at 636 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
124. Id. at 637 (emphasis added) (quoting Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, §§ 1-15, 22 
Stat. 58, 58-61).  
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any Chinese laborer . . . who thereafter left the United States [after the 
prescribed dates] taking with him the certificate prescribed by . . . [the 
1882 Exclusion Act], unless he produced such certificate at the time he 
sought to re-enter.”125 
He saw no reason to suggest that Congress intended to treat Chinese 
re-entering the country by sea differently from those entering by land.  
He dismissed the majority’s suggestion that the presence of the customs 
registry books kept at the port from which a Chinese resident departed 
justified the distinction.  Harlan noted that the petitioner could return to 
any port in the country under the Act and that the collector of customs at 
the port of entry “would have been without authority to accept affidavits 
in support of his [the Chinese petitioner’s] right to re-enter.”126  Finally, 
Harlan observed that the 1884 Amendments to section 4 made clear 
Congress’ intent that “said certificate shall be the only evidence 
permissible to establish his right of re-entry.”127  Harlan argued “[t]his 
did not declare a new rule, but indicates, in language clearer than that 
previously used, the intention of congress in passing the act of 1882.”128 
Although working a terrible hardship on Jung Ah Lung personally, 
Harlan’s reading of the statute seems truer to the principle that courts 
should seek to interpret statutes according to their language and 
legislative intent than does that of the majority.  The distinction the 
majority purported to find in the language of the statute seems like a 
pretext for achieving a desired outcome.  The majority position seems to 
be an example of a court offering a distorted reading of a statute for the 
purpose of doing justice in a particular case.  The majority may have 
been more willing to do this than in most cases because the 1884 
amendment, expressly limiting proof of the right to re-enter by sea to 
production of the certificate, meant the Jung Ah Lung decision would 
have almost no effect on anyone but the petitioner in that case. 
Harlan’s opinion ends with what, at first blush, seems a cruel and 
uncaring comment.  “If appellee’s certificate was forcibly taken from 
him by a band of pirates, while he was absent, that is his misfortune.”  
But this was not his point.  He continued: “That fact ought not to defeat 
what was manifestly the intention of the legislative branch of the 
government.”129  It is this second sentence rather than the first that 
 
125. Id. at 637-38.  
126. Id. at 638. 
127. Id. (quoting the Act of July 5, 1889, 23 St. 115). 
128. Id. at 639. 
129. Id. (emphasis added).  By the time Jung Ah Lung was decided in February, 1888, it 
must have been general knowledge in official Washington that the United States had been in 
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deserves emphasis.  Although aware of the injustice that his reading of 
the statute would work, he still insisted that the Court should not rewrite 
the statute for the sake of a result in a particular case.  Changes, if they 
were to be made, should be made by the legislative branch not by the 
Court.  In his Jung Ah Lung dissent, Harlan deferred to what he believed 
to be the clearly expressed intent of Congress.  This is what he had said, 
in Chew Heong, he would do when Congress made its intention clear.  
Harlan’s deference for legislative intent and his posture of judicial 
restraint were characteristic of Harlan across a whole spectrum of cases 
and of legal issues.130  These themes were central threads in Harlan’s 
judicial philosophy.  That he felt strongly enough about these principles 
to write a dissent in Jung Ah Lung tells us nothing about Harlan’s 
personal views on Chinese exclusion. 
It was not until 1889, in the case of Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States,131 that congressional power to enact the Exclusion regime was 
challenged directly.  In this unanimous decision, which Harlan silently 
joined, the Court held that Congress had plenary power over 
immigration and that policy decisions of the political branches, in this 
area, must be respected by the courts.  This result can be explained best, 
not as an expression of anti-Chinese sentiment, but, as one scholar 
described it, as an application of “classic notions of national 
sovereignty.”132 
Chae Chan Ping came to the Court after the enactment of the Scott 
Act of 1888 and tested its constitutionality.133  It was in this case that the 
Court first articulated Congress’ “plenary power” over immigration.  
This idea would have appealed to Harlan as a proponent of expansive 
national power and restriction of state power over immigration, without 
regard to his personal attitude toward the Chinese. 
Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer who had been domiciled in San 
Francisco for twelve years, returned to China on a three-month visit after 
obtaining a certificate that, under the 1882 and 1884 Chinese Exclusion 
 
negotiations for almost two years with China for a treaty to prevent Chinese immigration and 
to forbid the return to the United States of Chinese laborers traveling abroad.  Harlan may well 
have been aware of the sentiment in Congress in favor of taking unilateral action against the 
Chinese in the event that the treaty was not approved and that may have helped to determine 
his position in the case.  MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 192-93.  
130. See e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82 (1911) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 66 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); United States v. E.C. Knight, 
156 U.S. 1, 18 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
131. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
132. MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 281. 
133. MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 193-94. 
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Acts, would permit him to re-enter the United States on his return.  
However, during his absence, Congress passed the Scott Act of 1888, 
which forbade the return of Chinese laborers to the United States even if 
they had a certificate under the earlier acts.  When Chae Chan Ping 
returned to California, the collector of the port denied him permission to 
land.  Held by the captain of the ship for return to China, he sought a 
writ of habeas corpus.  The petitioner attacked the 1888 Act as an 
expulsion of Chinese laborers from the country in violation of the 1880 
Sino-American treaty and the 1882 and 1884 Exclusion Acts, arguing it 
was an attack on property rights vested in these laborers under the prior 
law. 
Writing for a unanimous court and reiterating Harlan’s position in 
Chew Heong, Justice Field held that Congress had the power to abrogate 
or modify a treaty by ordinary legislation and that the decision to do so 
was exclusively within the discretion of the political branches.134  He 
held further that such decisions were not subject to judicial review.135  
Holding that control over immigration was an attribute of national 
sovereignty, he concluded that the political branches had exclusive 
control over the subject.136  These were momentous premises because, 
once conceded, they greatly restricted the scope of judicial power in 
future cases involving Chinese immigration.137  In response to the 
petitioner’s argument that the new statute destroyed a vested property 
right to re-enter the country, Field compared the right to a license, which 
was revocable at the will of the sovereign because the power to exclude 
any alien at will is an essential attribute of sovereignty that could not be 
restricted.138  Given Harlan’s views supporting national power (that it 
 
134. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600-01.  Justice Field rehearsed many of the 
arguments he would later include in his opinion in Chae Chan Ping, while on Circuit in 
California in 1883.  See In re Ah Lung, 18 F. 28 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).  Justice Field, speaking 
for a unanimous Court had earlier held that statutes passed by Congress, which were 
inconsistent with a treaty, were controlling.  Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). 
135. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602. 
136. Id. at 603-04. 
137. For an appreciation of the baleful influence of Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting 
(the other seminal immigration plenary power doctrine case) and for a powerful argument in 
favor of its reconsideration, see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race 
Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998).  See 
also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854, 863 (1987); Janel Thamkul, 
Comment, The Plenary Power-Shaped Hole in the Core Constitutional Law Curriculum: 
Exclusion, Unequal Protection, and American National Identity, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 553 
(2008). 
138. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.  “The rights and interests created by a treaty, 
which have become so vested that its expiration or abrogation will not destroy or impair them, 
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should be read expansively) and on judicial role (that judges should act 
with restraint and defer to the political branches), it is not surprising that 
he would silently join the opinion.  Thereafter, Chae Chan Ping would 
control his future votes in cases involving Chinese immigration. 
In his opinion, Field, the Californian and the Justice with the 
greatest first-hand experience on the Chinese question, repeated many of 
the allegations set out earlier by the California state senate Special 
Committee on Chinese Immigration and in the report of the 
congressional Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese 
Immigration.139  He described as “well-founded” the fears of Pacific 
Coast White Americans that their “civilization” could be swamped by 
massive immigration from China.140  He suggested that the social 
tensions created by economic competition between Whites and Chinese 
immigrants were exacerbated by racial differences.141  He also 
emphasized, again, as he had earlier in his dissent in Chew Heong,142 the 
alien-ness of the Chinese and their refusal to assimilate. 
[T]hey remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, 
and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country.  It 
seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to 
make any change in their habits or modes of living.  As they grew in 
numbers each year the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw, 
in the facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions of China, 
where population presses upon the means of subsistence, great 
danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be 
overrun by them . . . .143 
Finally, Field analogized Chinese immigration to “foreign 
aggression and encroachment” and argued that whether these effects 
come from the policy of another nation or as a result of “vast hordes of 
its people crowding in upon us” makes no difference.  The nation must 
have the power to protect itself.144 
 
are such as are connected with and lie in property capable of sale and transfer, or other 
disposition, not such as are personal and untransferable in their character.”  Id. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75. 
140. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 594. 
141. Id. at 595. 
142. See supra Part III.B. 
143. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595.   
144. Id. at 606.  Field’s record on the Chinese was more mixed than this opinion 
suggests.  His early opinions on the California Supreme Court seemed to favor the Chinese; so 
much so that they generated anger against him and affected his political prospects.  Some of 
his opinions on Circuit after his appointment to the Supreme Court also seemed to favor the 
Chinese.  See, e.g., In re Ah Sing, 13 F. 286 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); In re Ah Tie, 13 F. 291 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1882); In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); In re Tiburcio 
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But, none of these “facts” were necessary to the Court’s reasoning 
or holding and, although one might wish that Harlan had challenged 
Field’s “facts,” merely joining in the opinion did not mean Harlan 
embraced them.145  Given the purpose of dissenting opinions (to call into 
question the majority’s legal reasoning or conclusions), it seems unfair 
to condemn Harlan for failing to write a dissent challenging not Field’s 
legal reasoning or his legal conclusions (with which Harlan agreed), but 
Field’s “facts” about the Chinese recited in Chae Chan Ping.  Field 
presented these “facts” as context and justification for what Congress 
had done, not because they were constitutive to the legal conclusions in 
the case.  Harlan could challenge the “received wisdom” about Black 
Americans because his understanding was shaped by direct personal 
experience with Blacks; he had a personal baseline against which to 
compare popular beliefs.  It seems almost unnecessary to observe that he 
had no similar personal resource to draw upon when he encountered 
stereotypes about the Chinese. 
Of course, it could be argued that Harlan should have challenged 
Field’s “facts” because their predicate was so clearly racism.  But, even 
with the evidence of his dissents in cases involving Black Americans, no 
one claims that Harlan had our twenty-first century sensitivity to racism.  
He was a late nineteenth century American and, like his contemporaries, 
he breathed an atmosphere infused with such racist ideas.  In fairness, 
one must consider the extent to which the criticism of Harlan in regard to 
the Chinese cases ultimately rests upon the allegation that, though he had 
begun, he had not finished integrating fully our modern understanding of 
race.  This ignores the fact that he lived not in our time, but in his own. 
 
Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880); In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874); Ho An 
Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879); see also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 
701 (1887) (Field, J., dissenting).  Personally, Field favored exclusion of the Chinese and he 
believed as early as the 1870s that power over immigration was vested exclusively in 
Congress.  See SWISHER, supra note 78, at 205-39.  While opposing “petty annoyances” of the 
Chinese, he told an interviewer in 1879:  
We are alarmed upon this coast at the incursion of the Chinese. . . . [A]ll classes 
of our society . . . have a serious apprehension of the consequences of Chinese 
immigration.  In the language of Senator Booth, we declare that it is our 
conviction ‘that the practical issue is, whether the civilization of this coast, its 
society, morals, and industry, shall be of American or Asiatic type.’  It is to us a 
question of property, civilization, and existence.  
Interview with both Frank M. Pixley, S.F. ARGONAUT, and Whitelaw Reid, N.Y. TRIBUNE, 
SWISHER, supra note 78, 221 (quoting S.F. ARGONAUT (Aug. 9, 1879)). 
145. For proof of how unnecessary were Justice Field’s “facts” about the Chinese to 
deciding the issues presented in Chae Chan Ping, compare Judge Sawyer’s opinion in the 
Circuit Court below.  In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431 (C.C.D. Cal. 1888). 
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In 1892, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,146 the Court decided 
another case, which though interpreting a general immigration statute 
rather than statutes commanding Chinese exclusion, had a profound 
effect on future decisions of the Court in relation to the Chinese.  In 
Nishimura Ekiu, immigration officials refused admission to a Japanese 
woman finding her excludable as “a person without means of support, 
without relatives or friends in the United States . . . , unable to care for 
herself, and liable to become a public charge . . . .”147  The statute 
expressly provided that “[a]ll decisions made by the inspection 
officers . . . touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse to such 
right, shall be final, unless appeal be taken to the superintendent of 
immigration, whose action shall be subject to review by the secretary of 
the treasury.”148  The Petitioner argued that due process required judicial 
review of the immigration official’s fact-finding.  The Court again held 
that the Constitution had vested in the political branches of the national 
government exclusive power over the regulation of immigration and 
added that Congress could delegate fact-finding to executive officers and 
assign finality to their decisions.  “[N]o other tribunal, unless expressly 
authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to re-examine or controvert the 
sufficiency of the evidence on which he, [the inspector], acted.”149  
Justice Brewer dissented without opinion.  Justice Harlan silently voted 
with the majority. 
In Nishimura Ekiu, the Court deferred to Congress not only on the 
substantive policy decisions embodied in immigration statutes, as it had 
done already in Chae Chan Ping.  The Court went further and deferred 
also on the procedural claims presented.  By reading congressional 
power broadly and the statute literally, the Court denied itself the 
authority to consider future procedural fairness claims.  These claims 
were bound to arise under a system of enforcement, created by 
 
146. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
147. Id. at 656.  This language tracked the provisions of the statute listing the bases for 
excluding an immigrant.  Petitioner was 25 years old and her passport indicated she was 
traveling with her husband to San Francisco, which was not the case.  After what appears to 
have been a summary inquiry on board ship, the immigration official refused her entry.  She 
claimed to have come to the United States to join her husband who had been a resident for 
over a year.  She was unable to give his address or indicate how she was to find him.  She 
claimed she was to find lodgings in a hotel and wait for him to find her.  It seems clear that the 
immigration officer who refused her entry did not believe her story but that no effort was 
made to verify it.  On habeas, the court below refused her proffer of proof of her right to enter 
the country holding that Congress had made findings by immigration officials unreviewable 
by the courts.  Id. at 652-53. 
148. Id. at 653-54. 
149. Id. at 660. 
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Congress’ broad delegation of fact-finding to inspectors, in which many 
of those charged with enforcement believed it their duty to keep Asians 
out whenever and however possible.  In this, again they were probably 
carrying out the true intent of the political branches.  By its reading, the 
Court denied itself the power to intervene, review, and reverse 
unfounded or unfair findings.  This, in turn, meant that the Court would 
deny itself any role in the case by case fact-finding upon which the 
enforcement of immigration policies would depend.  In 1894, Congress 
used the Court’s decision in Nishimura Ekiu to enact a general 
prohibition against judicial review of immigration fact-finding.150 
Although Nishimura Ekiu displays, to the modern eye, a stunning 
lack of interest in the procedures employed by the inspectors in making 
their factual determinations, it is important to remember that modern due 
process had not yet been invented and that by doing what it did, the 
Court was responding to a clear statutory expression of congressional 
intent that the courts not be involved in the process.  It is hard to imagine 
the late nineteenth century Court taking on the task of specifying how 
the inspectors must go about their work.  The Court deferred, accepting 
the command of Congress in an area, which the majority believed 
belonged to Congress and the executive.151  As a result, Congress, rather 
than the Court, deserves whatever opprobrium is attached to procedures, 
which in practice often denied petitioners a fair hearing before an 
impartial decision maker. 
Four years after Chae Chan Ping, a second important case, Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States,152 challenged the revisions to the Exclusion 
 
150. See Act of July 18, 1894, ch. 301, p. 320, 28 Stat. 1893-94. 
[I]n every case where an alien is excluded from admission into the United States 
under any law or treaty now existing or hereafter made, the decision of the 
appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the admission of such 
alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the secretary of the treasury.  
Id.  Congress may have enacted this language in part because of the Court’s decision in Lau 
Ow Bew, 144 U.S. 47 (1892), and to make clear that the statute applied to alien residents who 
left the country and sought to return as well as to those seeking admission for the first time. 
151. For examples of this deference in later cases, see Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 
158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902); Lee Gon Young v. 
United States, 185 U.S. 306 (1902); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Sing Tuck v. 
United States, 194 U.S. 161 (1904); and Ju Toy v. United States, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).  But 
even deference had some limits.  In Yamataya, Harlan, writing for the Court, warned that 
immigration officials were subject to some procedural constraints the violation of which might 
lead to court review of their proceedings.  In Ju Toy, the Court hinted that an allegation that 
the immigration official had abused his authority might present a case for judicial review.  
Finally, in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908), the Court held that, at least as to 
those claiming citizenship, petitioners could obtain court review if they proved that the 
administrative hearing had been unfair. 
152. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).  The Court decided two other cases relating to Chinese 
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regime embodied in the Geary Act of 1892.  Fong Yue Ting is a critical 
case in the revisionist argument against Harlan and is one of the cases 
the Court cited most frequently in future cases involving Chinese 
immigration.  In Fong Yue Ting, the Court reviewed the cases of three 
Chinese men who had entered the country lawfully before passage of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.153  The Geary Act renewed the 
Exclusion Regime for ten more years.  In addition, it required the 
Chinese who were legally resident in the country to obtain a certificate 
of identification within one year or be subject to arrest, imprisonment, 
and then expulsion from the United States.  Thus the case involved not 
 
immigration between Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, both were overshadowed by the 
three famous and formative cases Chae Chan Ping, Nishimura Ekiu, and Fong Yue Ting.  
Harlan participated in both but failed to write an opinion in either. 
  The first of these cases was Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891).  In Quock 
Ting, a sixteen-year-old Chinese youth was denied admission to the country despite his claim 
to have been born in San Francisco and to have lived there until he was ten years old.  At the 
age of ten, he and his father both claimed, he traveled to China with his mother and remained 
there for six years.  In response to a habeas petition, claiming he was wrongfully excluded 
from the country because he was a citizen of the United States, the court below, after a 
hearing, found that he had failed to establish his birth in the United States, and denied him 
entry.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Field, writing for the majority, held that 
despite the fact that the testimony of the boy and of his father was uncontradicted, the finder-
of-fact did not have to believe their evidence.  The Court did what appeals courts are supposed 
to do, it deferred to fact-finding below unless there was no evidence to support the finding or 
reasonable persons could not have reached the result below based on the evidence.  Justice 
Brewer wrote a lone dissent in which he acknowledged that the case turned on a question of 
fact but argued that uncontradicted testimony must be taken as true.  Brewer concluded: “The 
government evidently rested on the assumption that because the witnesses were Chinese 
persons they were not to be believed.  I do not agree with this.”  Id. at 424 (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). 
  The second case was Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.S. 424 (1891).  In Wan Shing, 
the habeas petitioner was denied re-entry, after passage of the Scott Act of 1888, upon his 
return from China.  He claimed to be a merchant doing business in San Francisco.  The court 
below found that he failed to prove this claim.  On appeal, Justice Field, writing for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, held that since the petitioner could not produce the certificate from 
the Chinese government required of merchants by the 1888 Act, he was property denied entry.  
Field held that the 1888 Act made this certificate “the sole evidence permissible” to establish a 
merchant’s right to enter the country.  Id. at 427.  The Court applied the literal language of the 
statute. 
153. The facts alleged in the three cases were well designed to test the constitutionality 
of all elements of section 6 of the statute.  The first petitioner, though resident before the 
passage of the act, had never applied for the required certificate.  Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 702 (1893).  The second petitioner, alleged similar facts but added that 
the petitioner had been ordered deported “without any hearing of any kind.”  Id. at 703.  The 
third petitioner alleged that though he had established his legal residence by the testimony of 
Chinese witnesses to the satisfaction of a federal judge, he was denied a certificate because he 
could not produce at least one “credible white witness, as required by the statute.”  All three 
petitioners alleged that they had been arrested and detained without due process of law and 
that section 6 of the 1892 Act was unconstitutional.  Id. at 703-04. 
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only Congress’ “plenary power” over immigration but also its power to 
require Chinese residents to obtain “identity cards,” and the power to 
order the expulsion, without trial, of Chinese immigrants who were 
already lawfully resident in the country. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Gray sustained the statute and 
denied the petitioners relief.  Gray refused to distinguish between the 
Chinese lawfully resident in the United States and those who sought 
admission.  Relying on Chae Chan Ping and citing numerous treatises 
on international law as well as English case law, Gray held that Congress 
had the same plenary power over both groups.154  He also rejected the 
proposition that deportation was punishment and, as such, required a trial 
before it could be imposed.155  As a result, he also rejected the argument 
that this power could be exercised only with judicial oversight.  Ignoring 
how difficult it might be to locate white witnesses who could testify 
about a petitioner’s residency status, Gray also held that placing the 
burden of proof on the petitioner and limiting the kind of evidence that 
was admissible (such as requiring the testimony of at least one “credible 
white witness”), as Congress had done, was “within the acknowledged 
power of every legislature . . . .”156  Finally, Gray held that in requiring 
them to obtain identity papers Congress had done nothing more than to 
exercise its power to attach conditions to the privilege, extended at 
congressional sufferance to the Chinese, of remaining in the country.157  
Noncompliance with these conditions resulted in abrogation of their 
licenses to stay.  Gray relied heavily on Justice Field’s opinion in Chae 
Chan Ping to support these conclusions. 
Justice Brewer, who joined the Court in January, 1890, and had not 
participated in Chae Chan Ping, wrote a powerful dissent in Fong Yue 
Ting.158  Although acknowledging that Congress had plenary power over 
 
154. Id. at 705-11.  “The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not 
been naturalized, or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the 
same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their 
entrance into the country.”  Id. at 707.  Gray ignored the fact that the Chinese could not take 
steps to become citizens because Congress had denied them access to citizenship by 
naturalization. 
155. Id. at 709 (“‘Deportation’ is the removal of an alien out of the country simply 
because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any 
punishment being imposed or contemplated.”). 
156. Id. at 729.   
157. Id. at 714 (“Congress, having the right, as it may see fit, to expel aliens of a 
particular class, or to permit them to remain, has undoubtedly the right to provide a system of 
registration and identification of the members of that class within the country, and to take all 
proper means to carry out the system which it provides.”). 
158. Id. at 733.  
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Chinese immigration, Brewer challenged almost all of Gray’s other 
conclusions.  Brewer argued that the Chinese, who had lawfully entered 
the country with the intent to remain in the United States under the 
treaties, which preceded the Exclusion Acts, were entitled to the same 
protections under the Constitution as any other “person” residing within 
the territory of the United States.159  He insisted that the Bill of Rights 
applied to them and that they could not be deported without due 
process.160  In effect, Brewer argued for an intermediate status between 
alienage and citizenship that entitled members of the class, “legal aliens 
permanently resident in the United States,” (domiciliaries) to all of the 
protections guaranteed by the Constitution to “persons” within the 
jurisdiction of the United States.161  Finally, Brewer insisted that 
deportation of a resident alien was punishment and as such could be 
imposed only after a trial.162  As his dissent in Fong Yue Ting suggested, 
Brewer would become the champion of the Chinese in many of the cases 
which came to the Court thereafter.163 
 
159. Justice Brewer stated: 
It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty.  This doctrine of 
powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous.  Where are the 
limits to such powers to be found, and by whom are they to be pronounced?  Is it 
within legislative capacity to declare the limits?  If so, then the mere assertion of an 
inherent power creates it, and despotism exists. 
Id. at 729 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  Later, he continued: 
Whatever may be true as to exclusion . . . I deny that there is any arbitrary and 
unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens. . . .  [T]he constitution 
has potency everywhere within the limits of our territory, and the powers which the 
national government may exercise within such limits are those, and only those, 
given to it by that instrument. 
Id. at 737-38. 
160. Id. at 737 (“[W]hatever rights a resident alien might have in any other nation, here 
he is within the express protection of the constitution, especially in respect to those guaranties 
which are declared in the original amendments.”). 
161. Id. at 738.  
162. “Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home and family and 
friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, 
and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.”  Id. at 740.  Brewer continued:  
[P]unishment implies a trial: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.”  Due process requires that a man be heard 
before he is condemned, and both heard and condemned in the due and orderly 
procedure of a trial, as recognized by the common law from time immemorial. 
Id. at 741. 
163. See Chin, Harlan By the Numbers, supra note 11, at 638-39.  Brewer also 
dissented in Nishimura Ekiu but did not write an opinion.  Justice Brewer’s championship of 
the Chinese and of immigrants in general appears to have been rooted in his religion.  He 
argued that by welcoming all immigrants, the United States was making it possible for home 
missionaries to proselytize the world and for humanity to be perfected.  In describing the 
future American, he used the metaphor of a composite photograph of all of the races of 
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Surprisingly, Justice Field wrote in dissent as well.  He too 
distinguished exclusion of the Chinese immigrants from deportation of 
Chinese lawfully domiciled in the United States, arguing that the latter 
were entitled to all of the provisions of the Constitution for protection of 
their persons and property.164  Field pointed out that the cases cited by 
the majority were all cases involving the exclusion of aliens as they 
sought admission to the country and did not address the question of 
deporting them after they had become legally domiciled here.165  Field 
regarded the decision as “a blow against constitutional liberty, when it 
declares that [C]ongress has the right to disregard the guarantees of the 
constitution intended for the protection of all men domiciled in the 
country with the consent of the government, in their rights of person and 
property.”166 
Despite one scholar’s assertion to the contrary, Harlan did not 
participate in Fong Yue Ting.167  Harlan had sailed for France on August 
6, 1892,168 to serve as one of the American representatives in the Bering 
Sea Fur-Seal Arbitration.  Harlan did not return to the United States until 
October 5, 1893.169  The opinion in Fong Yue Ting was announced on 
 
humanity with only the best traits of each race remaining.  See Justice Brewer, Address to the 
American Home Missionary Society, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 1892), in LXV THE HOME 
MISSIONARY 275 (Sept. 1892), available at http://archive.org/stream/homemissionaryma65am 
er#page/275/mode/1up.  In 1904 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Brewer expressed his views on 
Chinese Exclusion very clearly when he spoke before a meeting of the Northwestern Mutual 
Life Insurance Agents’ Association and said: “I think that the time will come when the people 
of the United States will look back to the barbarous laws excluding the Chinese, as the citizens 
of Massachusetts look back to the hanging of the witches.”  In the same speech, he again used 
the metaphor of the future American as a composite photograph of all human races.  See Says 
U.S. Is Photographer; We Must Take All Nations for One Picture—Justice Brewer, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 1904. 
164. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 754-56 (Field, J., dissenting). 
165. Id. at 757.  
166. Id. at 760. 
167. Professor Maltz suggests that Harlan’s silence in Fong Yue Ting coupled with his 
dissent in the case of Wong Kim Ark, which I will discuss later, “create a dramatic 
counterpoint to his famous dissents in Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases.  In the latter cases, he 
stood alone in advocating stronger protection for the rights of free Blacks.  By contrast,” 
Professor Maltz argues, “he was the only Justice to join both the majority in Fong Yue Ting 
and the dissent in Wong Kim Ark.”  Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind, supra note 10, at 1014-
15. Maltz concluded that “Harlan took a consistently anti-Chinese position on other 
constitutional issues that came to the Court.”  Id.  This mistake has been surprisingly long-
lived and continues to appear in the literature.  See Goodwin Liu, The First Justice Harlan, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 1383, 1385-86 (2008).  Professor Chin recognized that Harlan did not 
participate in Fong Yue Ting but he suggested that Harlan agreed with the majority. 
168. YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 187-88. 
169. “Justice John H.[sic] Harlan of the United States Supreme Court was a passenger 
on the steamship Majestic, which reached her pier yesterday. . . .  To a reporter for The N.Y. 
Times he said that he was preparing a report on the Bering Sea arbitration.”  Supreme Court 
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May 15, 1893.  The case was argued and decided while Harlan was out 
of the country. 
If one wishes to speculate on how Harlan might have voted had he 
participated in Fong Yue Ting, it is helpful to compare Brewer’s dissent 
in Fong Yue Ting with Harlan’s dissents in the Insular Cases.170  It is 
striking how similar they are.  In the Insular Cases, Harlan embraced the 
argument his friend Brewer had made in his Fong Yue Ting dissent that 
“the [C]onstitution has potency everywhere within the limits of our 
territory, and the powers which the national government may exercise 
within such limits are those, and only those, given to it by that 
instrument.”171  In Fong Yue Ting, Brewer had argued, as Harlan would 
argue eight years later in his dissent in Downes v. Bidwell,172 that it was 
the jurisdiction of the United States, which determined the rights of a 
petitioner, not his or her race.173  The parallels between these dissents 
suggest that had Harlan participated in Fong Yue Ting, he might have 
sided with Brewer on one of the pivotal questions in the case.174 
 
Justice Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1893.  
170. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hawaii v. 
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 226 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
244, 375 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
171. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
172. Downes, 182 U.S. at 276 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
173. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 393-96; see also Eric Schepard, The Great 
Dissenter’s Greatest Dissents: The First Justice Harlan, the “Color-Blind” Constitution and 
the Meaning of His Dissents in the Insular Cases for the War on Terror, 48 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 119 (2006).  But see United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904).  In Sing Tuck, a 
majority, which included Harlan, speaking through Justice Holmes, refused to review the 
decision of an immigration agent who refused re-entry to a person claiming to be an American 
citizen of Chinese ancestry.  Brewer, in dissent, catalogued a myriad of violations of due 
process embodied in the rules promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, 
regulating immigration officers, and what he labeled the “Star Chamber” proceedings over 
which they presided. 
174. There is a piece of evidence, not ever presented elsewhere to my knowledge, 
which may suggest Harlan would have voted with the majority in Fong Yue Ting.  From Paris, 
on March 30, 1893, Harlan wrote a teasing, playful letter to his friend Justice Brewer.  See 
Letter from Justice John Marshall Harlan to Justice David J. Brewer (Mar. 30, 1893), DAVID 
JOSIAH BREWER PAPERS, SERIES I, BOX 1, FOLDER 40, in Yale University Library Collection, 
Archives and Manuscripts Division.  Unfortunately, part of the joke was that Harlan wrote the 
letter in French, a language with which he appears to have been somewhat acquainted but in 
which he was not really fluent.  As a result, understanding exactly what Harlan meant presents 
a puzzle in translation and interpretation.  Harlan’s handwriting, always difficult to decipher, 
becomes even more difficult to read when he is writing in a foreign language.  Despite these 
concerns, one paragraph of the letter is important because it suggests that Harlan, himself, was 
against large-scale, unregulated, Chinese immigration.  After a warm salutation and a pleasant 
good morning, Harlan wrote: 
Les journaux vous reprèsente de nouveau apparaissant devant le public – cette fois-
ci defendant les droits fondamentaux permettant les Chinois de s’attrouper en 
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Of course, this is speculation.  What cannot be disputed, though, is 
that in later cases that raised the issues decided in Fong Yue Ting, that 
case was, on Harlan’s return to the Court, a fait accompli.  After the 
decisions in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, the precedents clearly 
confirmed Congress’ plenary power over immigration and commanded 
judicial deference to the political branches in matters involving 
 
fourmilière à travers notre pays selon leur dèsir.  Je dois avouer que je suis contraire 
à cette opinion et durant le cours de l’ètè je me promets de vous envoyer mes vues 
completes en Francais.  L’usage de ma langue anglaise me deviant passablement 
gênante. 
A literal translation of this paragraph, including some possible variant translations of some 
individual words [placed in brackets] might be: 
The newspapers report [present or depict] you once again as appearing before the 
public – this time supporting the fundamental rights allowing the Chinese to gather 
together [to flock together] in crowds [in the anthill] to cross to our country 
according to their pleasure [at will].  I must confess [acknowledge] that I am 
opposed to [against] this opinion and during the course of the summer I propose 
[promise myself] to send you my complete views in French.  Use of my English 
language is becoming fairly troublesome [inconvenient]. 
  Harlan’s use of the word “fourmilière” illustrates the problem inherent in translation.  If 
Harlan used the word “fourmilière” to mean “anthill” and meant to conjure the image of the 
Chinese in China as swarming in an anthill, that would tell us something important about his 
attitude toward the Chinese.  If, on the other hand, he used the word to mean “a crowded 
place” one’s impression would be very different. 
  Fong Yue Ting was argued to the Court on May 10, 1893, and the decision was 
announced on May 15, 1893, six weeks after Harlan’s letter to Brewer.  This means that the 
reference in the letter to Brewer “appearing before the public” in support of unlimited Chinese 
immigration rights could not have been a reference to Brewer’s dissenting opinion in that 
case.  I have been unable to locate any American newspaper report that Brewer had made a 
public statement about Chinese immigration in the weeks preceding Harlan’s letter.  Likewise, 
I have been unable to find Harlan’s “summer letter” (if it was ever written) setting out 
Harlan’s complete views on Chinese immigration.  What a find that would be! 
  There are two things worth observing as one seeks to understand the position Harlan 
appears to stake out in this letter.  First, as described by Harlan, the newspapers reported that 
Brewer favored unlimited and unregulated Chinese immigration as a fundamental right.  
When Harlan expressed his opposition to this view, was he against all Chinese immigration to 
the United States?  Was he against unlimited Chinese immigration?  Was he against Chinese 
immigration without regulation?  Or, perhaps, his opposition was to the idea that immigration 
to the United States could be a fundamental right for aliens?  This would open the door for all 
immigrants, something Harlan’s nativist inclinations would, of course, lead him to oppose.  
Like all of the rest of the evidence, Harlan’s statement here is ambiguous.  It does not make 
clear which of these possible positions he intended to communicate to Brewer. 
  Second, it seems strange, given the intimacy of their friendship and the ongoing public 
and judicial preoccupation with Chinese immigration in the 1880s and early 1890s, that, if 
Harlan had strong views about Chinese immigration, he only now communicated these views 
to his friend Brewer.  If Harlan was an anti-Chinese racist, how could Brewer have been 
unaware of this fact?  Given Brewer’s strongly-held views on these questions, revealed in his 
Fong Yue Ting dissent and in numerous cases thereafter, the fact that he did not know 
Harlan’s views on Chinese immigration may suggest that Harlan had no strong opinions on 
the subject one way or the other at the time Fong Yue Ting was decided. 
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immigration policy.  Since the Court had already held, in Nishimura 
Ekiu, that Congress could give finality to the findings of fact made by 
immigration officials, (that there could be no judicial review of such 
findings), Harlan was bound thereafter by well-settled precedents to 
follow these holdings whether he agreed with them or not.  Stare decisis 
controlled Harlan’s discretion and he did defer. 
In 1895, in Lem Moon Sing v. United States,175 when Harlan wrote 
on Chinese immigration for the first time since Chew Heong and Jung 
Ah Lung, his opinion clearly reflected the limits imposed on him by 
precedent, especially by Nishimura Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting.  In Lem 
Moon Sing  Harlan did little more than cite prior decisions of the Court 
and indicate that they were controlling. 
Lem Moon Sing was a Chinese druggist who had been domiciled in 
San Francisco for two years when he took a trip to China.  On his return, 
the Collector of San Francisco refused to admit him though the petitioner 
claimed to be a merchant exempt from the Exclusion regime.  In 1894, 
Congress had provided that whenever an alien, claiming a right to 
admission under any law or treaty, was excluded from admission, “the 
decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to 
the admission . . . shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the 
Secretary of the Treasury.”176  Lem Moon Sing petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus claiming on due process grounds, that he was entitled to 
have his exclusion reviewed by the federal courts.  The court below held 
that because of the statute it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the habeas 
petition. 
Harlan, writing for the Court, held that the case was “in principle, 
covered by the former adjudications of this court.”177  Citing Chae Chan 
Ping and Fong Yue Ting and, applying the plenary power doctrine, 
Harlan repeated that Congress had the power to exclude aliens from the 
country and that when an alien resident voluntarily left the country, even 
briefly, his or her readmission was at the sufferance of Congress.178  
Then, quoting from Nishimura Ekiu, Harlan wrote: 
[A]lthough congress might, if it saw fit, authorize the courts to 
investigate and ascertain the facts upon which the alien’s right to 
land was made by the statutes to depend, yet congress might intrust 
the final determination of those facts to an executive officer, and . . . 
 
175. 158 U.S. 538 (1895). 
176. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, quoted in Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 
540. 
177. Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 541. 
178. Id. at 543. 
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if it did so, his order was due process of law, and no other tribunal, 
unless expressly authorized by law to do so, was at liberty to re-
examine the evidence on which he acted or to controvert its 
sufficiency . . . . The power of congress, therefore, to expel, like the 
power to exclude, aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the 
country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers . . . .179 
Harlan noted that the petitioner did not challenge the power of 
Congress to give finality to immigration officers’ decisions in cases of 
first entry by a merchant after the passage of the 1894 Act.  The 
petitioner argued that since he was a merchant domiciled in the United 
States before passage of the Act and entitled to return, he was also 
entitled to a judicial hearing before being stripped of that right.  If he had 
the right to re-enter, the argument continued, it was beyond the scope of 
the immigration officer’s authority to exclude him and thus the door to 
judicial review was open as a matter of due process.  The contention, 
according to Harlan, was that in cases where the alien was rightly 
excluded, the immigration officers’ decision was not subject to judicial 
review, but that in cases where the immigration officer wrongly 
excluded an alien, the courts had power to review that decision.  “That 
view, if sustained,” Harlan observed: 
[W]ould bring into the courts every case of an alien claiming the 
right to come into the United States under some law or treaty, but 
who was prevented from doing so by the executive branch . . . .  This 
would defeat the manifest purpose of congress in committing to 
subordinate immigration officers and to the secretary of the treasury 
exclusive authority to determine whether a particular alien seeking 
admission into this country belongs to the class entitled by some law 
or treaty to come into the country, or to a class forbidden to enter the 
United States.  Under that interpretation . . . the provision . . . would 
be of no practical value.180 
Given the premise that Congress could give fact-finding by 
immigration officials finality in these cases, the conclusion followed.  
The Court would soon struggle with the same questions in relation to 
review of fact-finding by other administrative agencies and, in the early 
Twentieth Century reach the same result.181  Given the clarity of the 
 
179. Id. at 545 (citation omitted). 
180. Id. at 547. 
181. See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Ala. Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 176 
(1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Harlan dissented in favor of a broad reading of national power 
and because the decision made the I.C.C. impotent); see also Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Interstate 
Commerce Comm’n, 206 U.S. 441 (1907) (Court deferred to fact-finding by administrative 
agency).  Brewer dissented in Ill. Central Ry. Co.   
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statutory language and the Court’s prior decisions, it is difficult to see 
how the Court or Harlan could have reached a different conclusion.  
Harlan said this expressly in his opinion.182 
Harlan carefully distinguished the situation of an alien seeking 
admission to the United States from abroad, even one who was 
domiciled in the United States, from that of an alien physically present in 
the country.  The latter “[w]hile he lawfully remains here . . . is entitled 
to the benefit of the guaranties of life, liberty, and property secured by 
the constitution to all persons, of whatever race, within the jurisdiction 
of the United States.”183  Harlan continued: “His personal rights when he 
is in this country . . . are as fully protected by the supreme law of the 
land as if he were a native or naturalized citizen of the United States.”184 
This was the position Harlan consistently took in the Chinese cases 
not involving immigration and foreshadowed the position he would later 
take in his Insular Cases dissents.  This language, though dicta in the 
case, seems to confirm my earlier speculation that had Harlan 
participated in Fong Yue Ting he might well have joined Brewer’s 
dissent on this point.185 
Harlan ended his opinion by emphasizing that the Court’s decision 
had nothing to do with the merits of Lem Moon Sing’s claim.  “We 
mean only to decide that that question has been constitutionally 
committed by congress to named officers of the executive department of 
 
182. “There is no room in the language of the act of 1894 to doubt that congress 
intended that it should be interpreted as we have done in this case.”  Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. 
at 549.  The Court would return to this “judicial restraint” theme over and over again, 
sometimes expressing what seems like sympathy for the excluded Chinese and criticism of the 
inflexible Exclusion regime.  “We cannot . . . yield to the earnest contention made in behalf of 
inoffensive Chinese persons who seek to come within the limits of the United States and 
subject themselves to their jurisdiction, by modifying or relaxing, by judicial construction, the 
severity of the statutes under consideration.”  Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486, 495 
(1901); see also Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 305 (1902); Lee Gon Yung v. 
United States, 185 U.S. 306, 307 (1902). 
183. Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 547 (emphasis added).   
184. Id.  When he noted that Harlan did not participate in Fong Yue Ting, Professor 
Chin suggested that “Harlan’s frequent citation of Fong Yue Ting betrayed no lack of 
sympathy for its reasoning or result.”  Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 161.  In 
support of this observation, in a footnote, he cites Harlan’s references to the case in Lem Moon 
Sing and Yamataya.  In that note, in a parenthetical to Lem Moon Sing, Chin described 
Harlan’s opinion in Lem Moon Sing as “discussing Fong Yue Ting at length with approval.”  
Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 161 n. 71.  In Lem Moon Sing, Harlan did make 
reference to Fong Yue Ting’s holding that Congress had plenary power over immigration.  
Harlan cited the case for no other proposition.  His decision in Lem Moon Sing rests more 
fully on Nishimura Ekiu and its holding that Congress could give immigration officers final 
fact-finding authority. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 159-75. 
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the government for final determination.”186  This hints that Harlan would 
have decided the case differently on the merits had he felt himself free to 
do so.  The simplest explanation of Harlan’s opinion in Lem Moon Sing 
is that he felt constrained to decide the case as he did, as he said he was, 
by the Court’s prior decisions.187 
Harlan wrote again on Chinese immigration in 1902.  In United 
States v. Lee Yen Tai,188 a Chinese laborer was arrested in New York for 
coming “unlawfully . . . into the United States from China.”189  After a 
hearing as mandated by the Exclusion Statutes, a United States 
commissioner found Lee Yen Tai was in the country illegally and 
ordered his deportation to China.  The petitioner then sought a writ of 
habeas corpus alleging that the Sino-American Treaty of 1894190 had 
repealed the enforcement provisions of the Exclusion Statutes by 
implication thereby nullifying the statutory procedures for arrest, trial, 
and deportation.  The District Court certified the question directly to the 
Supreme Court. 
Writing for a unanimous Court and citing his earlier opinion in 
Chew Heong, Harlan held that the treaty was not intended to repeal the 
Chinese Exclusion Acts by implication.  Although acknowledging that a 
treaty could repeal an act of Congress if so intended, Harlan observed 
that it would do so only if the treaty said so expressly or by necessary 
implication.  “A statute enacted by Congress . . . should never be held to 
be displaced by a treaty, subsequently concluded, unless it is impossible 
for both to stand together and be enforced.”191  He then concluded that 
the purpose of both China and the United States in negotiating the 1894 
treaty was to prevent Chinese laborers from illegally entering the United 
States.  This purpose would be defeated if the Chinese Exclusion Acts’ 
procedural regime were abrogated without putting something else in its 
place.  “A different conclusion would be hostile to the objects which, as 
avowed in the treaty, both the United States and China desired to 
accomplish.  This is so clearly manifest that argument cannot, as we 
think, make it more so.”192  Given the absence of enforcement and 
procedural provisions in the treaty, it is difficult to see what else the 
Court could have done.  It is noteworthy that neither Justice Brewer nor 
 
186. Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 549-50. 
187. Justice Brewer dissented but failed to write an opinion. 
188. United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902).   
189. Id. at 214. 
190. Immigration Convention, U.S.-China, Mar. 17, 1894, 28 Stat. 1211. 
191. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. at 222. 
192. Id. at 223. 
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Justice Peckham, both of whom frequently dissented in the Chinese 
immigration cases, dissented.193 
Harlan wrote his last words on Asian immigration in 1903, in 
Yamataya v. Fisher.194  Writing for a majority of seven justices, he 
expressed misgivings about the fairness of immigration proceedings and 
warned Congress and the executive that the Court’s patience was not 
inexhaustible. 
In Yamataya, immigration officials arrested and sought to deport a 
Japanese woman who had landed in Seattle days earlier.  Upon 
investigation, the immigration agent in Seattle determined that she was a 
pauper and thus should not have been permitted to enter the country.  
Under the 1891 general immigration statute, he sought an order from the 
Secretary of the Treasury for her arrest and deportation.  While she was 
being held for deportation, the petitioner obtained a writ of habeas 
corpus, to test her confinement.  When the writ was dismissed below, 
she appealed to the Supreme Court. 
In his opinion, Harlan conceded that it was now well-settled that the 
“power to exclude or expel aliens” belonged to the political department 
and that executive officers could be given the power to determine finally 
the facts related to an alien’s right to enter or remain in the country.195  
Quoting from Nishimura Ekiu, Harlan wrote: 
[T]he order of an executive officer invested with the power to 
determine finally the facts upon which an alien’s right to enter this 
country, or remain in it, depended, was ‘due process of law, and no 
other tribunal, unless expressly authorized to do so, was at liberty to 
re-examine the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its 
sufficiency.196 
However, Harlan then continued, in language that can only be read 
as an attempt to limit the scope of these authorities: 
But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as 
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions 
of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the 
fundamental principles that inhere in “due process of law” as 
 
193. For a re-evaluation of Justice Peckham’s record on the Court including his position 
in the Chinese cases, see James W. Ely, Jr., Rufus W. Peckham and Economic Liberty, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 591, 632-634 (2009). 
194. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
195. Id. at 100. 
196. Id. (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (citing 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) and Lem Moon Sing v. United 
States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895))).  
JAMES W. GORDON  
338 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:287 
understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.197 
Harlan then expressly rejected a construction of the statutes that 
would allow the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer 
“arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered the country, and has 
become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its 
population” to be arrested and deported without an opportunity to be 
heard on the question of his or her right to be and remain in the United 
States.198  “No such arbitrary power can exist,” Harlan argued, “where 
the principles involved in due process of law are recognized.”199  
Immigration officials “may [not] disregard the fundamental principles 
that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the 
adoption of the constitution.”200  These fundamental principles included 
the right to be heard and present a defense to the official who would pass 
on questions involving a person’s life, liberty, or property.  The hearing 
need not be “upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of 
judicial procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action 
contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the 
nature of the case upon which such officers are required to act.”201  
Aliens who had entered the country and “become subject in all respects 
to its jurisdiction, and a part of the population, although alleged to be 
illegally here”202 were entitled to those constitutional protections which 
guarded all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States from 
arbitrary arrest and conviction without an opportunity to be heard. 
Still, despite the petitioner’s allegations that she lacked 
representation at her hearing and an understanding of English, did not 
understand that her deportation was at issue at the hearing, and that the 
hearing was “a pretended . . . one,”203 Harlan offered her no relief.  She 
was notified of the deportation investigation, participated in a hearing, 
and was heard by the immigration officer.  Harlan did not comment on 
the unfairness of such a proceeding, something apparent today under our 
modern understanding of due process, but neither did he approve it.  He 
did not reach the question whether she had received due process.  Rather, 
he argued that if these allegations were true, the petitioner should have 
 
197. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added).  The Court would later act on this 
warning, at least in a situation where the petitioner alleged he or she was an American citizen, 
in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908). 
198. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. 
199. Id.  
200. Id. at 100.  But see United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904). 
201. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 93. 
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presented her objections to the presiding officer at her hearing and, if 
denied satisfaction there, she should have raised them on appeal, as 
provided by the statutes, to the Secretary of the Treasury.204  In other 
words, Harlan insisted on what has become known as the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies doctrine and refused to inquire into matters 
which the petitioner could have had considered by administrative 
authorities at her hearing or on appeal. 
It seems unlikely that Justices Brewer and Peckham, who dissented 
in Yamataya without writing opinions, disagreed with Harlan’s statement 
limiting the scope of the earlier cases and emphasizing the necessity of 
some version of procedural due process in the application of the 
immigration statutes.  Brewer had argued for something like this 
repeatedly.205  It seems more likely that they disagreed with Harlan’s 
failure to set out clearly the minimum requirements of due process for 
executive hearings and his failure to award the petitioner the relief she 
sought.206 
Harlan’s position in Yamataya was consistent with the stance he 
took in a number of earlier cases.  Deference for executive fact-finding 
did not necessarily mean Harlan would defer to arbitrary decision 
making or that he believed residents inside our borders could be treated 
with the same degree of impunity from review as those seeking 
admission from outside those borders.  Those outside the border were 
subject to the will of Congress; those inside the border were protected 
fully by the Constitution without regard to their race.  This reading is 
consistent with the position Harlan took in the non-immigration cases 
 
204. Id. at 101-02. 
205. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). 
206. Harlan also seems to have been concerned about the posture of the case as a habeas 
appeal.  Even if the petitioner’s allegations were true, Harlan thought the presentation of these 
issues by habeas an inappropriate use of the writ.  Her situation “constitutes no reason, under 
the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for the intervention of the court by habeas 
corpus.”  Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 102.  A year later, these concerns came to the fore when 
Harlan silently joined the majority in United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904), in 
holding that other procedural remedies must be exhausted before petitioning for habeas 
corpus.  In a detailed opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes discussed fully the reasons not to 
allow “a summary interruption of the regular order of proceedings, by means of the writ”  Id. 
at 168.  He viewed the premature resort to the writ as an “attempt to disregard and override the 
provisions of the statutes and the rules of the Department, and to swamp the courts by a resort 
to them in the first instance”  Id. at 170.  In Sing Tuck, Justice Brewer contested all of Holmes’ 
premises in a powerfully reasoned dissent in which Justice Peckham joined, but they were 
unable to persuade the majority.  Id. at 170-75 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  As a plea for a 
fundamentally fairer process, at least for those Chinese claiming American citizenship, this 
dissent deserves to rank among the great historic appeals for fair treatment and in defense of 
the principle of limited government as a defense for liberty.  
JAMES W. GORDON  
340 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:287 
involving the Chinese and in the Insular Cases involving the inhabitants 
of the new insular possessions obtained in 1898.  The Constitution 
protected all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.  
Congress could determine whether to acquire overseas possessions, but 
having done so, the Constitution extended its protections of life, liberty, 
and property to the inhabitants of those territories.  By coming within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, they had also come under the protection 
of the flag and the Constitution.  The same was true of immigrants once 
inside the country. 
Harlan’s opinions in many of these cases seem to be examples of 
what Justice Holmes once described as “old Harlan . . . roll[ing] off the 
cases”;207 that is, stringing quotations and citations together without 
offering any original argument.  These opinions are surprisingly 
pedestrian and uninspired when compared to the passion and flights of 
oratory Harlan displayed in many of his opinions on Black rights or in 
cases like United States v. E. C. Knight Co., Lochner v. New York, 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, and the Insular 
Cases.208 
Harlan’s positions in the immigration cases should be read through 
the lens of Harlan’s generalized nativism, his strong preference for the 
exercise of national power, and his commitment to judicial restraint.  
Once the political branches had made political decisions about 
immigration restriction and embodied those decisions in clear and 
straightforward legislative language, Harlan was inclined to give them 
scope.  Once the Court, in its more comprehensive opinions touching 
immigration, had created a body of settled law and principles on the 
subject of immigration restriction and deference to executive fact-
finding, Harlan would have felt compelled by the principle of stare 
decisis to apply that law and those principles.  These influences explain 
Harlan’s votes and opinions quite well, without supposing a particular 
hostility to the Chinese on racial grounds. 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that even when acting 
under the influence of these powerful personal themes, Harlan insisted 
 
207. Letter from Mr. Justice Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollack (Jan. 7, 1910), in 1 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 158 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
208. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Standard Oil 
Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Insular Cases (Dorr v. United States, 
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
244 (1901)).  They also suffer by comparison to the passionate dissents that Justice Brewer 
wrote in a number of the Chinese cases. 
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on taking seriously treaty rights and the constitutional protection of all 
persons resident in the United States.  Immigration was sui generis.  It 
implicated fundamental principles of sovereignty, national power, and 
institutional roles.  As a result, in the area of immigration, Harlan 
believed Congress was entitled to broad discretion.  Harlan’s few written 
opinions involving Chinese immigration are more notable for what they 
tell us about his approach to the judicial function than about his 
supposed anti-Chinese race prejudice. 
C.   The Chinese and American Citizenship: United States v. Wong Kim 
Ark and Elk v. Wilkins 
In addition to his votes in the immigration cases, those who have 
argued that Harlan was anti-Chinese have pointed to United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark209 to support this hypothesis.  The question presented in 
Wong Kim Ark was whether a child born in the United States to lawfully 
resident, non-citizen, Chinese parents was a citizen of the United States 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In order to answer this question, the 
Court had to interpret the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside.”210  Resolution of this question turned on the 
meaning of “born . . . in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof.” 
Applying the English common law in default of a constitutional 
definition of citizenship, the majority held that place of birth determined 
citizenship subject to two exceptions.  Children born to foreign 
diplomats while in the country and those born to enemy nationals in 
areas that had been invaded and were under enemy occupation remained 
citizens of their parents’ country.  Applying this definition, the majority 
held that children born to Chinese residents were citizens despite the fact 
that, under federal law, their parents could not be admitted to citizenship. 
Chief Justice Fuller wrote a dissent which Harlan joined.  Fuller 
rejected the common law rule arguing it was a municipal regulation 
derived from English feudalism.  Instead, he argued that under 
international law citizenship followed descent.  He claimed that the 
language “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” would be surplusage if 
limited in its application to the children of diplomats because their 
children already were excluded under international law.211  Fuller then 
 
209. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
210. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
211. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 720-21 (Fuller, J., dissenting). 
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argued: 
 But there were others in respect of whom the exception was 
needed, namely, the children of aliens, whose parents owed local and 
temporary allegiance merely, remaining subject to a foreign power 
by virtue of the tie of permanent allegiance, which they had not 
severed by formal abjuration or equivalent conduct, and some of 
whom were not permitted to do so if they would. 
 And it was to prevent the acquisition of citizenship by the children 
of such aliens merely by birth within the geographical limits of the 
United States that the words were inserted.212 
Fuller continued: 
The [Civil Rights Act of 1866] was passed and the amendment 
proposed by the same congress, and it is not open to reasonable 
doubt that the words ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ in the 
amendment, were used as synonymous with the words ‘and not 
subject to any foreign power,’ of the act.213 
Fuller suggested that “[t]he jurists and statesmen referred to in the 
majority opinion, notably Senators Trumbull and Reverdy Johnson, 
concurred in that view, Senator Trumbull saying: ‘What do we mean by 
‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’’?  Not owing allegiance 
to anybody else; that is what it means.’”214  Senator Johnson had agreed 
with this interpretation: “‘Now, all that this amendment provides is that 
all persons born within the United States and not subject to some foreign 
power (for that, no doubt, is the meaning of the committee who have 
brought the matter before us), shall be considered as citizens of the 
United States.’”215  Fuller then cited Elk v. Wilkins,216 and quoted 
extensively from Harlan’s dissent in that case. 
In Elk, the majority had rejected the claim to citizenship of a 
Native-American who had severed all ties to his tribe.  In his dissent, 
Harlan argued that upon severance from his tribe and acquisition of 
 
212. Id. at 721. 
213. Id.  This assertion has been challenged.  See Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: 
A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331, 353 (2010). 
214. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 721. 
215. Id. at 721-22.  Fuller ignored other comments Trumbull made during the Senate 
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  When asked whether the Civil Rights Bill would 
grant citizenship to Chinese born in the United States, Trumbull, the chief drafter of the Bill, 
answered yes.  Id. at 697 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 498, 563, 574 
(1866)).  Senator Howard expressed the same view when asked whether the citizenship clause 
of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment would apply to American-born children of Chinese.  
Id. at 698-99 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 2890-92 (1866)). 
216. 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
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residence in Nebraska, Elk, who had been born in the United States, 
came within the definition of citizenship set forth in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866.  That definition provided: “all persons born in the United States 
and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are 
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”217  Harlan argued 
that: 
[T]he act of 1866 reached Indians not in tribal relations.  Beyond 
question, by that act, national citizenship was conferred directly upon 
all persons in this country, of whatever race, (excluding only 
‘Indians not taxed,’) who were born within the territorial limits of the 
United States, and were not subject to any foreign power.218 
This statement makes clear that Harlan was not averse to non-white 
citizenship.  Indeed, he endorsed it in circumstances in which the would-
be citizen owed complete allegiance to the United States.219 
Harlan then continued: 
 Our brethren . . . construe the fourteenth amendment as if it read: 
‘All persons born subject to the jurisdiction of, or naturalized in, the 
United States, are citizens of the United States and of the state in 
which they reside;’ whereas the amendment, as it is, implies in 
respect of persons born in this country that they may claim the rights 
of national citizenship from and after the moment they become 
subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States.220 
Harlan was analogizing tribal affiliation to foreign citizenship.  A 
Native-American, born in the United States but subject to the jurisdiction 
of a tribe, was, like the citizen of a foreign sovereign, born in the United 
States but subject to the jurisdiction of that foreign government.  Neither 
 
217. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. 
218. Elk, 112 U.S. at 112 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Harlan noted that 
the language “Indians not taxed” was added to the original bill to make clear that the drafters 
“disclaimed any purpose to make citizens of those who were in tribal relations, with 
governments of their own.”  Id. at 113. 
219. Id. at 118. 
220. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
If [Elk] did not acquire national citizenship on abandoning his tribe and becoming 
by residence in one of the states, subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United 
States, then the fourteenth amendment has wholly failed to accomplish, in respect to 
the Indian race, what, we think, was intended by it; and there is still in this country a 
despised and rejected class of persons with no nationality whatever, who born in our 
territory, owing no allegiance to any foreign power, and subject, as residents of the 
states, to all the burdens of government, are yet not members of any political 
community, nor entitled to any of the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of 
the United States. 
Id. at 122-23 (emphasis added). 
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was “subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States”221 and so 
not a citizen within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is 
equally clear from his dissent in Elk that the barrier to American 
citizenship, which Harlan found in the Fourteenth Amendment, was not 
grounded on race, but rather on the idea of dual allegiance.  American 
citizenship required a complete and unconditional commitment to the 
American polity because, for Harlan, once a person became a citizen, he 
or she was entitled fully to all of the “rights, privileges, or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”222 
Fuller’s dissent in Wong Kim Ark was in part a repetition of 
Harlan’s argument in Elk.  Fuller reiterated that when the Fourteenth 
Amendment speaks of “all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” that “[t]he evident 
meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or 
degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to 
their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate 
allegiance. . . . To be ‘completely subject’ to the political jurisdiction of 
the United States,” argued Fuller, “is to be in no respect or degree 
subject to the political jurisdiction of any other government.”223  Fuller 
went on to state that the cited language of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“undoubtedly had particular reference to securing citizenship to the 
members of the colored race, . . . who had been born in the United 
States, but were not, and never had been, subject to any foreign 
power.”224  He concluded: “is it not the proper construction [of the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment at issue] that all persons born in 
the United States of parents permanently residing here, and susceptible 
of becoming citizens, and not prevented therefrom by treaty or statute, 
are citizens, and not otherwise?”225 
Fuller’s disagreement with the majority was a disagreement about 
the meaning of the language of the disputed provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and over the historical meaning of citizenship under 
English and international law.  He argued that since Congress had 
declared by treaty and statute that the Chinese could not become 
naturalized citizens of the United States, and since they retained their 
Chinese citizenship, they were not “fully subject to the jurisdiction of the 
 
221. Id. at 121.  
222. Id. at 123.  
223. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 724-25 (1898) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. at 102). 
224. Id. at 727. 
225. Id. at 731 (Fuller, J, dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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United States.”226  As a result, their children, though born in the United 
States, could not be citizens either. 
Fuller’s argument assumed that all Chinese who lived in the United 
States were only temporarily resident here.  “[T]hey seem in the United 
States to have remained pilgrims and sojourners as their fathers were.  At 
all events, they have never been allowed by our laws to acquire our 
nationality, and except in sporadic instances, do not appear ever to have 
desired to do so.”227  In entertaining the conviction that Chinese 
residence in the United States was temporary, Justice Fuller made the 
same assumption about the Chinese that Justice Field had made.  All of 
Field’s descriptions of the Chinese as standing apart, as maintaining their 
own language and culture, as dreaming of their return to China, all of 
these ideas offered support for Fuller’s assumption.228  If the parents 
were merely “sojourning” in the United States and remained loyal 
subjects of the Chinese Emperor, the majority’s reading would impose 
American citizenship on the children of Chinese sojourners against their 
parents’ will, and might even compel their forced separation.229  Given 
these assumptions, it was plausible to read the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as Fuller did.  That these assumptions assume 
false facts (Field’s facts) and reflect ignorance of the real wishes of at 
least some Chinese residents seems apparent to us today, but ignorance 
and prejudice are not always the same thing.  That race prejudice played 
a large role in the political decisions that the United States made in 
relation to Chinese immigration cannot be doubted.  That the same 
prejudice accounted for the choices that Fuller and Harlan made in trying 
to respect and apply those political decisions is less clear. 
Although we may read into this dispute over the meaning of 
language an underlying bias against the Chinese, it is not clear that 
Fuller was influenced by anything other than a disagreement about the 
meaning of the words of the text and Congress’ past actions forbidding 
Chinese citizenship.  The assumptions of Fuller’s dissent in Wong Kim 
Ark were the assumptions entertained by many at the time.  If his 
premises had been right (that Chinese immigrants were sojourners who 
neither could nor wanted to become citizens or to renounce their 
allegiance to the Chinese Emperor), the logic of Fuller’s position can be 
 
226. Id. at 725-26, 731-32. 
227. Id. at 726. 
228. Fuller quoted the language of Fong Yue Ting to that effect.  See Id. at 725-26. 
229. If, in order to preserve that child’s Chinese citizenship, the mother left the country 
to deliver a baby, they both might be denied readmission under the Exclusion regime.  The 
risk of forced separation was also real since Chinese who failed to comply with the Geary Act 
could be forcibly deported. 
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understood, even if he was wrong. 
Joining Fuller’s dissent in Wong Kim Ark was consistent with 
Harlan’s dissent in Elk.  There Harlan had argued for the extension of 
American citizenship to Native Americans who severed all connections 
with the sovereignty of their tribes.  Harlan took the same position on 
citizenship in the Insular Cases when he argued, in dissent, for extension 
of the rights of citizenship to the multi-racial inhabitants of the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico after they became territories of the United 
States and their allegiance to any other sovereign was thereby severed.  
The difference between the majority in Wong Kim Ark and the dissenters 
was not about race but rather about the unitary character of allegiance.230 
That Fuller’s dissent and Harlan’s agreement were not necessarily 
the product of racism seems confirmed by the fact that Fuller had 
himself dissented in Fong Yue Ting.  In that dissent, Fuller made it clear 
that although the Chinese might be excluded by Congress through the 
exercise of its plenary power over immigration, the Chinese who were 
legally domiciled in the United States were still protected by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, “which forbid that any person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”231  
These clauses, Fuller argued, were “universal in their application to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of the United States] without 
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality . . . .”232  
 
230. In Professor Chin’s discussion of Wong Kim Ark, he referred to the brief submitted 
by the Justice Department and observed: “The Justice Department could have rested its 
argument solely on the technical principle of international law which, it claimed, rendered 
Chinese not fully ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the United States.  Instead, the government 
appealed explicitly to race . . . .”  Chin, The Plessy Myth, supra note 11, at 158.  Professor 
Chin associated Justice Harlan with the obnoxious brief by suggesting that:  
When faced with the prospect of Chinese citizens, . . . Harlan, along with Chief 
Justice Fuller, balked.  Evidently persuaded by the reasoning of the Justice 
Department, they determined that American-born Chinese “cannot become citizens 
nor acquire a permanent home here, no matter what the length of their stay may be.”  
Id. (quoting Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 731).  But, the fact that the brief urged a racist basis 
for decision does not mean that Fuller and Harlan embraced it.  Fuller did make the 
assumption that the Chinese were sojourners, but there is nothing else in his opinion that 
suggests he embraced the other racist arguments of the Justice Department brief.  Loren Beth 
states that Fuller worked hard behind the scenes to recruit other justices to his views but 
succeeded only in attracting Harlan.  “Why Harlan followed him,” Beth writes, “is a minor 
mystery.”  BETH, supra note 3, at 237.  Given Harlan’s opinion in Elk, it would be surprising 
if he had not joined Fuller’s dissent.  More to the point, Fuller’s opinion did rest upon his 
assertion that a “technical principle of international law . . . rendered [the] Chinese not fully 
‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the United States.”  Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 732 (Fuller, J., 
dissenting).  
231. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 761 (1893) (Fuller, J., dissenting). 
232. Id. at 761-62. 
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Fuller continued: 
Conceding that the exercise of power to exclude is committed to the 
political department, and that the denial of entrance is not necessarily 
the subject of judicial cognizance, the exercise of the power to expel, 
the manner in which the right to remain may be terminated, rests on 
different ground, since limitations exist or are imposed upon the 
deprivation of that which has been lawfully acquired.233 
The general government “cannot . . . arbitrarily deal with persons 
lawfully within the peace of its dominions” and therefore cannot deny 
them, without regard to race, due process.234  This is the position that 
Harlan took himself in Lem Moon Sing, Baldwin, and in other Chinese 
cases, and he would take again in the Insular Cases. 
D.   The Other Chinese Cases: Cases Not Involving Congress’ Plenary 
Power over Immigration 
It is a mistake to treat the immigration cases and the Court’s one 
case involving Chinese citizenship as the sum of the Court’s encounter 
with the problem of race and the Chinese.  In a number of other cases 
involving the rights of Chinese in America, Harlan took a much more 
protective posture than in the immigration cases.  In these “other” cases, 
he supported applying the Fourteenth Amendment protections of life, 
liberty, and property, to limit governmental discrimination against the 
Chinese and to protect individual Chinese from private violence or 
oppression. 
Two early cases raised Fourteenth Amendment challenges to a San 
Francisco ordinance imposing regulation on laundries and forbidding 
them to operate between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.235  In the first of 
these cases, Barbier v. Connolly, the Court viewed the ordinance as 
“purely a police regulation within the competency of any municipality 
possessed of the ordinary powers belonging to such bodies”236 and 
 
233. Id. at 762. 
234. Id. 
235. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 
(1885). 
236. Barbier, 113 U.S. at 30.  In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Field, 
treated the ordinance as a neutral fire protection regulation, a typical police power regulation 
protecting the health and safety of the people of the city.  He further held that it discriminated 
against no one because “[a]ll persons engaged in the same business within [the same area] are 
treated alike.”  Id. at 31.  Even though Justice Field must have known about its discriminatory 
motive, the Court made no attempt to look through the articulated purpose of the ordinance to 
uncover that discriminatory purpose (the desire to deny Chinese residents, who had a near 
monopoly of the laundry business in San Francisco, one of the few occupations at which they 
could make their living). 
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sustained the regulation.  In the second case, Soon Hing v. Crowley, the 
petitioner challenged a similar ordinance but now informed the Court 
that many laundrymen were Chinese, that there was “great antipathy and 
hatred” directed at the Chinese in San Francisco, that to run a laundry it 
was necessary to work at night, and alleged that the real purpose of the 
ordinance was to drive them out of business.237  The petition alleged both 
a violation of the Burlingame Treaty and of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  On appeal, the Court speaking again 
through Justice Field upheld the ordinance as a legitimate police power 
regulation.  It rejected both a freedom of contract argument against the 
regulation of working hours and, more importantly, refused to delve into 
the motives for enactment.  The unspoken motives of the supervisors 
were not a matter for the courts.  “The diverse character of such motives, 
and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and 
ascertaining the truth, precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and 
futile.”238  But, Field continued, even if a discriminatory motive could be 
proven, “the ordinance would not be thereby changed from a legitimate 
police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate only 
against the class mentioned . . . .”239 
The lawyers representing the Chinese petitioners were on a learning 
curve and so was the Court.  The very next case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,240 
alleged and proved Field’s “unless” and established a foundational equal 
protection principle.241  In Yick Wo, the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of San Francisco ordinances that required laundries to 
be located only in buildings of brick or stone.  The ordinances allowed 
 
237. Soon Hing, 113 U.S. at 706. 
238. Id. at 711. 
239. Id. (emphasis added). 
240. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
241. This pattern of claim, response by the Courts, and then adjusted claim, pervaded 
the Chinese cases as lawyers adjusted their allegations and strategy to work the gaps in court 
opinions.  From the number of cases brought and from their evolving character it is clear that 
persistent, well-funded, interest group litigation produced these cases.  See MCCLAIN, supra 
note 14, at 147-172, 191-219.  Although trapped in the immigration cases by its early 
definitive holdings that Congress had plenary power over immigration and that decisions by 
immigration agents were not reviewable by the courts, at least some members of the Court 
showed a capacity for growth as they became more educated about the circumstances of the 
Chinese on the West Coast.  McClain describes the laundry cases as an example of “judicial 
willingness to defend the rights of unpopular minorities in the face of popular pressure” and as 
representative of the Jacksonian principle that “individuals should be free from the effects of 
legislative favoritism as they sought to advance themselves economically through the pursuit” 
of a trade.  Id. at 130-31.  A similar capacity for growth did finally manifest itself even in 
regard to the finality of administrative decision-making and due process.  See Yamataya v. 
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); see also Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908). 
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the board of supervisors of the city to grant or withhold licenses for the 
operation of laundries in wooden buildings.  The board granted such 
licenses to eighty Caucasian laundries and denied them to 200 Chinese 
who had been operating laundries in wooden buildings for twenty years.  
All Chinese applications were rejected and all but one Caucasian 
application were approved.242  The Chinese petitioners challenged the 
application of the ordinance as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection clause. 
Justice Matthews, writing for a unanimous Court (including 
Harlan), held the ordinances unconstitutional on the ground that they: 
seem intended to confer, and actually do confer, not a discretion to 
be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case, 
but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not only 
as to places, but as to persons. . . . It is purely arbitrary, and 
acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint.243 
Quoting from Soon Hing,244 Matthews held that “all persons 
engaged in the same business [must be] treated alike, and subject[ed] to 
the same restrictions, and [are] entitled to the same privileges, under 
similar conditions.”245 
In considering the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Chinese, Matthews noted that “[t]he fourteenth amendment to the 
constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.”  It forbids any 
state from denying “‘any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.’”246 Matthews observed that “[t]hese provisions 
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of 
nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws.”247 
Then, Matthews made a crucial connection between the treatment 
 
242. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359.  Circuit Judge Sawyer’s powerful opinion in In re Wo 
Lee, 26 F. 471 (1886), a related case to Yick Wo, cast the case in a very favorable posture.  
Judge Sawyer demonstrated that the only possible purpose of the ordinance was to drive 
Chinese laundrymen out of business and showed how systematic the licensing officials had 
been in discriminating against Chinese laundrymen.  Sawyer’s opinion was cited and quoted 
extensively by the Court in Yick Wo.  118 U.S. at 361-63. 
243. Id. at 366-67. 
244. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885) (upholding an ordinance requiring 
that no washing or ironing be done in laundries between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. as a valid exercise 
of the police power because it was applied equally to all laundries). 
245. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 367. 
246. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV) 
247. Id. at 369. 
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of the Chinese under the San Francisco ordinances and slavery. 
[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or 
the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment 
of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any 
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery 
itself.248 
For Harlan, this would have been a powerful analogy.  Once Harlan 
saw the attempt to subordinate the Chinese to the whim of the white 
board in terms of the exercise of the kind of arbitrary power that was 
“the essence of slavery itself” all of his responses to the tyranny of Black 
slavery would have been engaged.  The subordination of, and 
discrimination against, the Chinese was on account of race (as was also 
true for Blacks), and was, thus, equally a violation of American 
republican principles. 
[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively 
against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the 
conclusion that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances 
as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities . . . with a mind 
so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the 
state of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the 
petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign 
provisions of the fourteenth amendment . . . .  Though the law itself 
be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied 
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal 
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations 
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the 
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the 
constitution.249 
This kind of discrimination, the passage of apparently race-neutral 
 
248. Id. at 370. 
249. Id. at 373-74.  For a more complicated explanation of Yick Wo, see Gabriel J. Chin, 
Unexplainable on the Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 ILL. L. REV. 1359 
(2008); Thomas W. Joo, Yick Wo Re-Visited: NonBlack Nonwhites and Fourteenth 
Amendment History, 2008 ILL. L. REV. 1427 (2008); see also Thomas Wuil Joo, New 
“Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights 
Cases and the Development of Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 353 
(1995).  This interpretation would not explain Harlan’s vote because he was largely immune 
to the substantive due process argument justifying the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
protect property interests against state regulation.  See, for example, Harlan’s dissent in 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which was overruled in part by Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).  This should remind us, if such a reminder is necessary, that 
Justices may cast similar votes for very different reasons.  For the traditional interpretation of 
Yick Wo, see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW §18.8(b) (4th ed. 2007). 
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laws that were in practice applied discriminatorily, was exactly the 
course being taken in the South against Blacks.  Harlan, who argued so 
strenuously against this system when resorted to in the South, could not 
have misunderstood the implications of what was happening in the West.  
The fact that the discrimination in Yick Wo affected the laundrymen’s 
livelihood and property rights also made the case appealing on its facts 
to the members of the largely conservative Court. 
A second case, involving the right of Chinese residents to be free 
from violence, Baldwin v. Franks,250 came to the Court the next year.  
The case grew out of what one scholar has called “The Anti-Chinese 
Hysteria of 1885-1886.”251 
Thomas Baldwin, with several others, was charged and convicted 
under federal civil rights statutes for participating in a criminal 
conspiracy to use intimidation and violence to drive the Chinese 
residents of the town of Nicolaus, California, out of the county.252  The 
defendants used force to round-up the Chinese residents of the town and 
herded them onto a steam barge in the Feather River, expelling them 
from their homes and businesses. 
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Waite, held the federal 
civil rights statutes under which Baldwin had been charged, did not 
apply to his case.  In United States v. Harris,253 the Court had already 
decided that section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of 1874 was 
 
250. 120 U.S. 678 (1887). 
251. “Outbursts of violence, individual and collective, directed at the Chinese, had 
punctuated California history from the beginnings of the immigration . . . .  The fall and winter 
of 1885-86, however, would prove to be a season of special ferocity.”  MCCLAIN, supra note 
14, at 173.  
252. The defendants were prosecuted for violating three sections of the Revised Statutes 
of 1874: 
Section 5519 made it a federal crime for “two or more persons [to conspire or go] on 
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving . . . any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges 
and immunities under the laws . . . .”   
Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 683-84 (quoting Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 7, § 5519, 18 Stat. 1076).  
Section 5508 made it a federal crime for 
two or more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any 
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by 
the constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . [to] go  . . . on the highway, or 
on the premises of another, with the intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise 
[thereof]. 
Id. at 684 (quoting §5508, 18 Stat. 1073).  Section 5336 made it a federal crime for “two or 
more persons . . . to conspire . . . to oppose by force the authority [of the United States], or by 
force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States . . . .”  Id. 
(quoting § 5536, 18 Stat. 1041-42).  
253. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
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unconstitutional as applied to conspiracies involving ordinary crimes 
committed by one citizen of the United States against another citizen 
within a state.  In Baldwin, the Court rejected the argument that it could 
still be read to protect aliens who asserted interference with rights 
guaranteed under a federal treaty.  The Court held that language in the 
section protecting aliens was also unenforceable because it was not 
severable from the part of the statute purporting to cover citizens.254  The 
Court also held that sections 5508255 and 5336256 did not apply.  Section 
5508 applied only to conspiracies against citizens using the word in its 
political sense “and not as mere persons, residents, or inhabitants.”257  
The majority held that section 5336 applied only to conspiracies to use 
force to oppose some assertion of national authority, “[a] mere violation 
of law is not enough.”258  While hinting that is was somewhat troubled 
by the effect of its restrictive construction of the statutes,259 the majority 
was far more concerned with reading these penal statutes as narrowly as 
possible, rather than with protecting peaceful resident Chinese against 
mob violence. 
In Baldwin, Harlan wrote an impassioned dissent in which he 
argued that the national government had a duty, under treaties with 
China, to protect the Chinese residing lawfully in the United States.  He 
argued that sections 5508 and 5336 should be applied to fulfill those 
obligations.  Carefully parsing section 5508, Harlan argued that even if 
the first clause applied only to citizens, the second clause was not so 
restricted.  There, the subject “with which congress was dealing was the 
protection of ‘any right or privilege’ secured by the constitution or laws 
of the United States.”260  Harlan continued: “In my judgment [this] case 
is within both the letter and spirit of the statute.”261  He was unwilling to 
“imput[e] to congress the purpose of withholding national protection 
from those who do not happen to enjoy the privileges of American 
citizenship, — a purpose inconsistent with the obligations which the 
 
254. Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 685. 
255. Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 7, §5508, 18 Stat. 1067-68. 
256. § 5336, 18 Stat. 1037. 
257. Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 691. 
258. Id. at 693.  Waite concluded: “The force [in this case] was exerted in opposition to 
a class of persons who had the right to look to the government for protection against such 
wrongs, not in opposition to the government while actually engaged in an attempt to afford 
that protection.”  Id. 
259. Waite wrote: “It may be that by this construction of the statute some are excluded 
from the protection it affords who are as much entitled to it as those who are included; but that 
is a defect, if it exists, which can be cured by congress, but not by the courts.”  Id. at 692. 
260. Id. at 695 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
261. Id. at 696. 
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nation has assumed by treaties with other countries.”262  In Harlan’s 
view, Congress intended “to guard the homes of all persons against 
invasion by combinations of lawless men, who seek, by entering those 
homes, to prevent the free exercise of rights secured by the constitution 
or laws of the United States.”263 
It is possible that Harlan’s default position that national power 
should be read broadly, and his desire to empower Congress to protect 
Black citizens influenced him, in this case, to read Congressional power 
more broadly than the majority.  However, it is clear that Harlan need 
not have argued for extension of civil rights protections to aliens in order 
to argue for their application to Black citizens.  In his dissent, he 
returned to Black civil rights to reiterate his argument in favor of a broad 
reading of Congress’ power under the enforcement clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Quoting from the Civil Rights Cases, Harlan 
renewed his objection to Harris, and then suggested: 
[T]he main purpose of giving congress power to enforce, by 
legislation, the provisions of the [Fourteenth ] amendment was that 
the rights therein granted or guaranteed might be guarded and 
protected against lawless combinations of individuals, acting without 
the direct sanction of the state.  The denial by the state of the equal 
protection of the laws to persons within its jurisdiction may arise as 
well from the failure or inability of the state authorities to give that 
protection as from unfriendly enactments.264 
The larger elements of Harlan’s jurisprudence do not explain his 
argument that section 5508 should protect aliens.  In fact, this 
interpretation cuts against his default statutory literalism since the first 
section of 5508 limits its application to citizens.  Rather, he appears to 
have responded to the image of a lawless mob attacking the law-abiding 
Chinese in the same way he responded to the lawless conduct of what he 
called “the Ku Klux” in Kentucky in the post-Civil War period, or as he 
responded to the lawless conduct of feral mobs engaged in similar and 
worse behavior toward Blacks throughout the South in these years, or as 
he would respond to the so-called “Night-riders” in Kentucky.265  While 
respecting the good judgment of the common man, Harlan feared the 
 
262. Id. (emphasis added). 
263. Id. at 697 (emphasis added). 
264. Id. at 700 (second emphasis added). 
265. Hartz, supra note 3, at 35-36.  In a private correspondence, Harlan wrote: “[t]he 
outstanding issue . . . must be settled whether we are to have a government of law at all, or the 
rule of the mob . . . .”  Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Augustus Willson (Aug. 24, 1908) 
(on file in the Willson Papers with The Filson Club, Louisville, Kentucky); see also BETH, 
supra note 3, at 81-97; YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 65-85; Westin, supra note 3, at 659. 
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irrational passions of a mob.  In Baldwin, the rule of law was at stake 
and, for Harlan, the rule of law was essential to civilized living and it 
applied to everyone subject to its authority.  Human beings needed 
restraint and the law was there to provide that restraint when self-control 
and the veneer of civilization wore thin and naked violence threatened.  
Harlan was a serious Calvinist.  As such, he believed he knew the evil 
potential of Fallen Man, and he cherished the law as given by God for 
Man’s management.266  Still more importantly, the parallels between the 
treatment of the freedmen in the South and the Chinese on the West 
Coast could not have escaped Harlan.  His reference to the Thirteenth 
Amendment and its operation not only to annul state laws upholding 
slavery but also “to establish ‘universal civil and political freedom 
throughout the United States,’ and to invest every individual person 
within their jurisdiction with the right of freedom” makes clear the 
connections he was making.  In Baldwin, in his dissent, Harlan put these 
pieces together and displayed a concern for Chinese rights as complete 
as his concern for the rights of the Black freedmen.267 
A third case, Wong Wing v. United States,268 implicating due 
process, came to the Court in 1896.  In Wong Wing, the petitioners were 
arrested in the city of Detroit for being in the country illegally.  They 
were brought before a commissioner of the federal circuit court, 
sentenced to hard labor, and ordered deported after completion of their 
 
266. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 366-68.  
267. See Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  His dissent in Baldwin was 
so important to Harlan that, near the end of his life, he included it in a list of his opinions he 
wanted collected and published.  See Personal Notes, John Marshall Harlan, In book 
containing my opinions & dissenting opinions publish the following, in HARLAN PAPERS, UL, 
supra note 1, at reel 14, frame 400-05, 404.  This list of cases is set out in PRZYBYSZEWSKI, 
supra note 10, at 209-11.  Even Harlan’s critic, Professor Maltz, has written “if only Yick Wo 
and Baldwin were considered, Harlan could well be characterized as a champion of the 
Chinese.”  Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind, supra note 10, at 1008.  Justice Field wrote a 
separate dissent in Baldwin in which he said he found Harlan’s argument about the last clause 
of 5508 persuasive but Field chose to rest his objection to the majority opinion on 5536.  He 
argued that the Burlingame Treaty with China in 1868 was self-executing and that the 
defendants’ conspiracy to expel all Chinese, not particular Chinese, from the town and county 
was a conspiracy to defeat the provisions of the Treaty.  Thus, the purpose of their conspiracy 
was “to nullify and defeat” the Treaty provisions permitting Chinese to reside in the United 
States.   
[I]n all cases . . . where a clause of a treaty conferring rights or privileges operates 
by its own terms and does not require congressional legislation to give it effect, a 
conspiracy to prevent by force their enjoyment is a conspiracy to prevent by force 
the execution of a law of the United States; that is, to prevent its having, with 
respect to the rights and privileges stipulated, any effectual operation. 
Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 766 (Field, J., dissenting). 
268. 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
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jail terms by a United States commissioner under the fourth section of 
the Geary Act of 1892.  The petitioners argued that the provision of the 
Act permitting imprisonment at hard labor before deportation, which 
provided for neither a grand jury indictment nor trial by jury, violated 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  The government argued that the 
offense was not an “infamous crime” and did not require indictment or 
trial by jury.269  Although the Court had previously held that it was 
within the power of Congress to order the summary deportation of 
Chinese persons illegally in the country, Wong Wing asked whether 
Congress also could order their punishment by imprisonment at hard 
labor without a jury trial. 
Justice Shiras, writing for the Court,270 observed that this question 
had been reserved in Fong Yue Ting.271  In Wong Wing, the Court held 
that Congress could provide for the detention of aliens pending 
expulsion as a necessary incident to the power to deport them.  However, 
the Court also held that Congress did not have the power to order 
punishment by imprisonment at hard labor without both a grand jury 
indictment and trial by jury. 
When congress sees fit . . . [to subject] the persons of . . . aliens to 
infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, 
we think such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial 
to establish the guilt of the accused.   
. . . It is not consistent with the theory of our government that the 
legislature should, after having defined an offense as an infamous 
crime, find the fact of guilt, and adjudge the punishment by one of its 
own agents.272 
Quoting Yick Wo, the Court held that the provisions of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments 
“are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or 
nationality” . . . .  [E]ven aliens shall not be held to answer for a 
capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
 
269. Id. at 234-35. 
270. Justice Brewer did not participate in Wong Wing.  Justice Field concurred in part 
and dissented in part.  Strangely, it was not from any part of the majority opinion that Field 
dissented.  Rather, he dissented in opposition to the argument made by counsel for the 
government that “persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond 
the protection of the law.”  Id. at 242-43 (Field, J., dissenting). 
271. Id. at 237. 
272. Id. 
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without due process of law.273 
Harlan joined the majority in Wong Wing without writing an 
opinion.  In Wong Wing, as in the other cases discussed in this section, 
the Court focused not on congressional power over immigration and 
deportation, (though all of the justices reiterated that Congress had 
plenary power over both subjects), but rather on what American 
Republicanism required. 
The question of who should be admitted to the Republic was a 
political question that Harlan seems to have believed was outside the 
competence of the judiciary.  But the question, what was required in 
regulating the rights of Chinese resident aliens to personal liberty and 
protection of property, once they were in the country, was an entirely 
different matter for Harlan.  Every person within the territorial limits of 
the United States or on land subject to American sovereignty, “without 
regard to race or national origin,”274 was entitled to the full protection of 
American law and of those parts of the Constitution that applied to all 
“persons.”  Harlan’s Yick Wo and Wong Wing votes and his Baldwin 
dissent suggest that he made this distinction.  His later dissents in the 
Insular Cases, insisting that this boundary existed, made his position 
undeniably clear.275 
In cases implicating these rights, Harlan was as protective of 
Chinese resident aliens as of Black citizens.  In both situations, if racism 
and equality before the law were at war, racism must give way.  For 
Harlan, with the Union victory in the Civil War this issue had been 
definitively resolved and that resolution had been memorialized in the 
amended Constitution.  If Harlan had doubts about whether the Chinese 
could be, with safety to American institutions, allowed to enter the 
country in large numbers, he knew that white racism and its corollary, 
subordination of those of color within the American community, posed a 
direct threat to American institutions.  To combat this threat, he insisted 
that once the Chinese were resident in the country, they were entitled to 
all the constitutional protections applied to other “persons.”  Harlan 
embraced this ideal more consistently than the Court upon which he 
served.  What he came to believe and what he wrote about the need to 
eradicate the race line where Blacks were concerned, he seems also to 
have come to believe about discrimination against Asians.276 
 
273. Id. at 238. 
274. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
275. See infra Part IV.  He had made the same point in Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 
158 U.S. 538, 549 (1895). 
276. This seems to be confirmed by a speech Harlan made at the University of 
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IV.   THE INSULAR CASES 
A series of cases that came to the Court in the first few years of the 
new twentieth century offered a number of opportunities for the justices 
to reveal their views on race and how the people of color inhabiting the 
lands newly acquired from Spain at the end of the Spanish-American 
War should be treated under the Constitution.  These cases, often labeled 
the Insular Cases, asked the same questions in a number of contexts.  
What was the constitutional status of these territories?  Did the United 
States Constitution apply to them?  If it did apply, did it apply in its 
entirety or only in some of its parts?  If only some of its parts applied, 
which parts were they?  All of these questions were boiled down, in the 
parlance of the day, to one: Did the Constitution follow the flag? 
Harlan consistently and with great passion urged that the 
Constitution applied in its entirety to the inhabitants of the island 
territories, whatever their race, cultural setting, or state of development, 
from the instant the United States assumed sovereignty over them.  In 
these views, he was joined by Justices Brewer and Peckham, the justices 
who were most sensitive to the rights of the Chinese, and by Chief 
Justice Fuller. 
Two early cases, De Lima v. Bidwell277 and Downes v. Bidwell,278 
presented the question whether the newly acquired territories were 
foreign or domestic, and whether the constitutional requirement that 
duties be uniform “throughout the United States” applied to Puerto Rico 
as part of the United States.  Two later cases, Hawaii v. Mankichi279 and 
Dorr v. United States,280 asked whether the constitutional provisions 
dealing with criminal prosecutions were in effect in Hawaii from the 
date of annexation, and whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial in criminal cases applied to the Philippines before “incorporation.”  
 
Pennsylvania in 1900, when he spoke on “James Wilson and the Formation of the 
Constitution.”  John Marshall Harlan, James Wilson and the Formation of the Constitution, 34 
AM. L. REV. 481 (1900).  Professor Przybyszewski dismisses this speech as a “4th of July” 
political speech of the kind Harlan might have given during his political career.  
PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 10, at 132.  But I would argue it was important because it 
reflected Harlan’s personal resolution of the problems with race with which the country was 
struggling in 1900.  At the time, the United States was wrestling not only with the problems of 
Black Americans and the Chinese, but also with the new iterations of the race problem 
presented by the acquisition of America’s first “outlying” dominions.  In struggling with the 
various strands of the “race problem” Harlan might well have reached the kind of synthesis he 
described in his University of Pennsylvania speech. 
277. 182 U.S. 1 (1901). 
278. 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
279. 190 U.S. 197 (1903). 
280. 195 U.S. 138 (1904). 
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In three of these four cases Harlan wrote passionate dissents arguing for 
immediate and full application of the Constitution to the new lands and 
to the newly-acquired Americans of color. 
In De Lima, the question was whether territory ceded to the United 
States by a foreign power, Spain, in this case Puerto Rico, was a “foreign 
country” for purposes of the tariff laws.  Justice Brown, writing for a 
majority consisting of himself, Chief Justice Fuller, and Justices Brewer, 
Peckham, and Harlan, held that once “foreign territory” was ceded to the 
United States, it ceased to be “foreign” for purposes of the tariff, but 
how much else was decided was unclear in a rambling and obscure 
opinion.  Lurking behind the tariff question was a much bigger issue: 
What was the status of the overseas peoples who had come along with 
the islands?  Were they Americans?  If the answer was yes, what was the 
extent of their constitutional rights? 
Gray, McKenna, Shiras, and White dissented in De Lima.  
McKenna, writing for three of the four, argued that the treaty with Spain 
expressly declared that “the status of the ceded territory is to be 
determined by Congress.”281  They argued that the new overseas 
territories were not “incorporated” into the United States until Congress 
chose to do so, but rather occupied a third status between being fully 
foreign and fully domestic.282 
The companion case, Downes v. Bidwell, saw Brown switch sides, 
supplying the dissenters in De Lima with the critical fifth vote to form a 
new majority.  Brown, Gray, and White wrote separate concurring 
opinions.  This fragmented majority held that, although no longer foreign 
territory, neither was Puerto Rico fully “a part of the United States.”283  
It was up to Congress to determine if and when the inhabitants of the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico should become citizens of the United States.  
In response to the fear that, if the Constitution did not apply in all its 
provisions to the overseas territories, Congress might exercise despotic 
power there, Brown wrote: “There are certain principles of natural 
justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character, which need no expression 
in constitutions or statutes to give them effect or to secure dependencies 
against legislation manifestly hostile to their real interests.”284 
Brown justified delaying citizenship because the permanent status 
of the islands was not yet decided.285  In the meantime, 
 
281. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 214 (McKenna, J., dissenting). 
282. Id. at 219. 
283. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249. 
284. Id. at 280. 
285. Id. at 283. 
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[e]ven if regarded as aliens, [their inhabitants] are entitled under the 
principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and 
property.  This has been frequently held by this court in respect to 
the Chinese, even when aliens, not possessed of the political rights of 
citizens of the United States.286 
Justice White wrote a concurrence in which Shiras and McKenna 
joined.287  White was honest enough to acknowledge that his reservations 
about automatically extending the entire Constitution to the overseas 
territories were grounded in the race and customs of their inhabitants.288  
White argued that the critical question was whether the territory had 
been “incorporated” into the United States or not.  This, he suggested, 
was a political decision for Congress with which the judiciary had 
nothing to do. 
Chief Justice Fuller dissented, with the concurrence of Justices 
Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham.  Fuller acknowledged that the United 
States could obtain territory “by conquest, by treaty, or by discovery and 
occupation” but argued that “[t]he source of national power in this 
country is the Constitution of the United States; and the government, as 
to our internal affairs, possesses no inherent sovereign power not derived 
from that instrument, and inconsistent with its letter and spirit.”289  Fuller 
rejected the idea that “if an organized and settled province of another 
sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has the power to 
keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous 
existence for an indefinite period . . . .”290  Fuller’s objection was to the 
proposition that the United States could acquire and rule over distant 
territories “to be governed by different rules than those obtaining in the 
original states and territories . . . .”291  He feared that accepting such a 
principle “substitutes for the present system of republican government a 
 
286. Id. (citing Yick Wo v.Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Wong 
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)). 
287. Downes, 182 U.S. at 306 (White, J., concurring). 
288. See id. at 282, 287 (White, J., concurring) (“It is obvious that in the annexation of 
outlying and distant possessions grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits, 
laws, and customs of the people, . . . which may require action on the part of Congress that 
would be quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by people 
of the same race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians. . . . If those possessions are 
inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and 
modes of thought, the administration of government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon 
principles, may for a time be impossible . . . .”). 
289. Id. at 369 (Fuller, J., dissenting). 
290. Id. at 372. 
291. Id. at 373. 
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system of domination over distant provinces in the exercise of 
unrestricted power.”292 
Justice Harlan joined Fuller’s dissent but also wrote separately.293  
Harlan feared that if the proposition that Congress could rule overseas 
possessions unrestrained by selected provisions of the Constitution, 
“[w]e will . . . pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and 
protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative 
absolutism.”294 
Monarchical and despotic governments, unrestrained by written 
constitutions, may do with newly acquired territories what this 
government may not do consistently with our fundamental law. . . .  
The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon the 
earth, by conquest or by treaty, and hold them as mere colonies or 
provinces, — the people inhabiting them to enjoy only such rights as 
Congress chooses to accord to them, — is wholly inconsistent with 
the spirit and genius, as well as the words, of the Constitution.295 
The echo of Dred Scott is unmistakable.  For Harlan, the legal 
subordination of other races violated fundamental constitutional 
principles.  Harlan rejected Brown’s suggestion that other races could 
rely on “Anglo-Saxon character” to protect them.  In rebuttal, Harlan 
observed that “[t]he wise men who framed the Constitution, and the 
patriotic people who adopted it, [had] proceeded on the theory . . . that 
the only safe guaranty against governmental oppression was to withhold 
or restrict the power to oppress.”296  Then, turning to the suggestion that 
it might be necessary for the United States to rule over places “inhabited 
by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of 
taxation, and modes of thought,” not capable of “the administration of 
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles,” Harlan 
insisted: 
Whether a particular race will or will not assimilate with our people, 
and whether they can or cannot with safety to our institutions be 
brought within the operation of the Constitution, is a matter to be 
thought of when it is proposed to acquire their territory by treaty.  A 
mistake in the acquisition of territory . . . cannot be made the ground 
for violating the Constitution . . . . The Constitution is supreme over 
every foot of territory, wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of 
 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 375 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
294. Id. at 379. 
295. Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
296. Id. at 381. 
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the United States . . . .297 
When forced to choose between the legal subordination of other 
races and constitutional republicanism, Harlan chose republicanism.  For 
Harlan, the overseas territories were now part of the United States and 
their inhabitants had become Americans.  Race did not determine who 
could or could not be an American and it could not justify subordination. 
Harlan’s observations in Downes v. Bidwell are reminiscent of those 
of Justice Brewer in the latter’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting.  The asserted 
power of Congress to provide for the banishment of the Chinese who 
failed to obtain the necessary certificate of residence in Fong Yue Ting 
was grounded in “inherent sovereignty” as was the majority position in 
Downes.  In Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting, he argued that: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite 
and dangerous.  Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and 
by whom are they to be pronounced? . . . The governments of other 
nations have elastic powers.  Ours are fixed and bounded by a 
written constitution.298 
Harlan could have included these words in his Downes dissent. 
In Fong Yue Ting, Brewer argued for a distinction between aliens 
seeking entry into the United States from outside and alien residents 
who, already present in the United States were subjected, in Fong Yue 
Ting, to summary expulsion. 
[I]t may be that the national government, having full control of all 
matters relating to other nations, has the power to build, as it were, a 
Chinese wall around our borders, and absolutely forbid aliens to 
enter.  But the constitution has potency everywhere within the limits 
of our territory, and the powers which the national government may 
exercise within such limits are those, and only those, given to it by 
that instrument.299 
In the Chinese cases, Brewer argued that power over aliens resident 
in the United States was still limited by other constitutional restrictions 
on the exercise of national power.  The Fifth Amendment requirement of 
due process and the rest of the Bill of Rights applied as limitations.  
 
297. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). 
298. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
299. Id. at 738.  Chief Justice Fuller had joined in this part of Brewer’s dissent in Fong 
Yue Ting.  Justice Peckham did not join the Court until 1895, but he was usually aligned with 
Justice Brewer in the Chinese cases on which he sat, and of course, Harlan did not participate 
in Fong Yue Ting but may well have agreed with Brewer if he had.  Thus, the alignment in the 
Insular Cases resembles the alignment of the dissenters in Fong Yue Ting, with the addition of 
Harlan. 
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Brewer noted that in many of these provisions “the word ‘citizen’ is not 
found.”300  In the Fifth Amendment, the word used was “person.”  Citing 
Yick Wo,301 which Harlan had joined, Brewer continued: “These 
provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, 
or of nationality . . . .”302  By siding, so emphatically, with Brewer and 
Fuller in Downes, Harlan implicitly rejected the most controversial parts 
of Justice Gray’s majority opinion in Fong Yue Ting. 
Harlan repeated his position two years later when he wrote, again in 
dissent, in Hawaii v. Mankichi.303  Mankichi was charged with murder 
without a grand jury indictment under Hawaii’s criminal justice system, 
as it existed before Hawaii was annexed by the United States.  He was 
then convicted of manslaughter by a petit jury that divided nine to three.  
The charge and conviction occurred between the time Hawaii was 
annexed to the United States in 1898, and the time that Congress 
enacted, in 1900, a comprehensive act organizing the territory.  Among 
other things, the 1900 act changed the Hawaiian criminal justice system 
to bring it into compliance with the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, as then understood, by requiring a grand jury indictment 
to initiate a charge for “a capital or otherwise infamous crime” and by 
requiring that a guilty verdict in a criminal case must be unanimous.  
After conviction, Mankichi sought release by habeas corpus.  It was 
granted by the United States district court.  On appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, a fractured Court reversed. 
Justice Brown, again writing for the Court, held that Hawaii was 
not incorporated into the United States until the Territorial Organization 
Act of 1900.  He held further that the language of the congressional joint 
resolution, annexing Hawaii in 1898, did not indicate that Congress had 
intended to change Hawaiian criminal procedure before 1900.304 
Chief Justice Fuller dissented, as he had done in Downes, again 
with the concurrence of Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham.  Fuller 
rejected the majority’s view that a grand jury indictment and the 
requirement of a unanimous petit jury verdict were procedural rather 
than fundamental rights.  Both requirements, Fuller argued, were 
imposed as soon as the American flag rose over Hawaii. 
While joining Fuller’s dissent, Harlan also again wrote separately.  
 
300. Id. at 739. 
301. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
302. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
303. 190 U.S. 197 (1903). 
304. Id. at 211. 
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He repeated his objection to the proposition that Congress could 
“withhold fundamental guarantees of life and liberty from peoples who 
have come under our complete jurisdiction; who . . . have become our 
fellow-countrymen; and over whose country we have acquired the 
authority to exercise sovereign dominion.  In my judgment,” he 
continued, 
neither the life nor the liberty nor the property of any person, within 
any of the territory or country over which the United States is 
sovereign, can be taken, under the sanction of any civil tribunal 
acting under its authority, by any form of procedure inconsistent with 
the Constitution of the United States.305 
This was consistent with the position he had taken in Yick Wo, Baldwin, 
Wong Wing, and in Wong Kim Ark.  It is also consistent with Justice 
Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting. 
Harlan explicitly rejected the idea that “constitutional provisions 
designed for the protection of life and liberty may be claimed by some of 
the people subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the United States, 
but cannot be claimed by others equally subject to its authority and 
jurisdiction.”306  He then argued: 
[I]f the principles now announced should become firmly established, 
the time may not be far distant when, . . . to gratify an ambition to 
become the dominant political power in all the earth, the United 
States will acquire territories in every direction, which are inhabited 
by human beings, over which territories, to be called ‘dependencies’ 
or ‘outlying possessions,’ we will exercise absolute dominion, and 
whose inhabitants will be regarded as ‘subjects’ or ‘dependent 
peoples,’ to be controlled as Congress may see fit, not as the 
Constitution requires nor as the people governed may wish.  Thus 
will be engrafted upon our republican institutions . . . a colonial 
system entirely foreign to the genius of our government and 
abhorrent to the principles that underlie and pervade the 
Constitution.307 
Finally, Harlan objected to the majority’s conception of statutory 
interpretation and its construction of the joint resolution in Mankichi.  
 
305. Id. at 236 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan maintained this position even after the 
others who had joined in Fuller’s dissent had given up.  See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 
138 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) 
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1907) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (without opinion). 
306. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 239 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
307. Id. at 240. 
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Asserting his view that the courts were constrained by the letter of the 
statute, he concluded: “We must interpret the law as it is written. . . .  
[W]hen the meaning of the statute is plain, there is no room for 
interpretation.  The consequences are for the lawmaking power.”308 
These words not only illustrate Harlan’s characteristic textual 
literalism, they might also serve as an answer to his critics in the Chinese 
immigration cases.  In those cases, it was deference to Congress rather 
than anti-Chinese animus that drove Harlan’s decisions.  Blame for the 
harms the Exclusion regime did to individual petitioners belongs to 
Congress, not to the Court. 
In Dorr v. United States,309 a prosecution for criminal libel under 
Spanish law before “incorporation” of the Philippines, the question was 
whether the inhabitants of the Philippines had a right to jury trial.  
Justice Day, writing for the majority argued that the right to trial by jury 
could not be extended to “the uncivilized parts of the archipelago,” to 
people who were “wholly unfitted to exercise the right.”310  In response, 
Harlan insisted the majority in Dorr had rewritten the jury trial provision 
of the Sixth Amendment so that it now read: “‘The trial of all crimes, 
except in cases of impeachment, and except where Filipinos are 
concerned, shall be by jury.’”311  Such gross reworking of the text, he 
fumed, “plays havoc with the old-fashioned ideas of the fathers . . . .”312  
He closed by quoting his own dissent in Mankichi: 
‘neither the life, nor the liberty, nor the property of any person, 
within any territory or country over which the United States is 
sovereign, can be taken, under the sanction of any civil tribunal, 
acting under its authority, by any form of procedure inconsistent with 
the Constitution of the United States.’313 
These dissents make it clear that Harlan’s views transcended race.  
Overseas expansion created a tension for Harlan.  His nativist 
inclinations pressed him to defend the Constitution and keep American 
 
308. Id. at 247-48.  
309. 195 U.S. 138 (1904). 
310. Id. at 145. 
311. Id. at 156 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion but adding the 
emphasized words to clarify his view of the majority’s holding).  
312. Id.  For an extensive discussion of Harlan’s views on the importance of the grand 
jury and petit jury system, see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538-58 (1884) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) and Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan 
included his Mankichi and Dorr dissents, (as well as Hurtado and Maxwell), in the list of 
twenty-four dissents he wanted published which he compiled near the end of his life.  
PRYZYBYZSEWSKI, supra note 10, at 2010-11. 
313. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 157 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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institutions “distinctly under the control of Americans.”  But he 
understood that there was another threat to those institutions and the 
Constitution he cherished.  If the United States exercised sovereignty 
over the inhabitants of color of “dependencies” either it must extend the 
authority of the Constitution to those places and those peoples, or it must 
betray its most fundamental republican principles and the Constitution 
itself in order to subordinate them.314  To Harlan’s credit, when he 
recognized the choice he faced, he consistently argued for republicanism 
and the application of the Constitution to everyone over whom the 
United States ruled.  This meant that the “color-blind” Constitution he 
had advocated in Plessy had to apply everywhere and the argument that 
distinctions could be justified on the basis of race or cultural inferiority 
must be rejected. 
But were the inhabitants of the island territories citizens?315  In his 
dissent in Downes, which Harlan joined, Fuller stated that “the subjects 
of the former sovereign are brought by the transfer under the protection 
of the acquiring power, and are so far forth impressed with its 
nationality, but it does not follow that they necessarily acquire the full 
status of citizens.”316 
 
314. Harlan made this point in a letter to Chief Justice Fuller.   
The more I think of these questions, the more alarmed I am at the effect upon our 
institutions of the doctrine that this country may acquire territory inhabited by 
human beings anywhere upon the [E]arth, and govern it as the will of Congress, and 
without regard to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution upon governmental 
authority. 
Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Melville Weston Fuller (July 8, 1901), quoted in BETH, 
supra note 3, at 253. 
315. Congress obviously did not think so.  Its continuing anti-Chinese prejudice found 
expression in the joint resolution annexing Hawaii.  It included language forbidding future 
Chinese immigration to Hawaii and provided that “except upon such conditions as are now or 
may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of 
anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian 
islands.”  Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 229 (1903).  Professor Beth, quoting from 
Harlan’s correspondence with William Howard Taft, who served as Governor General of the 
Philippines, writes that “Harlan . . . strongly intimated that he felt that residents of [the] 
possessions ought to have all the rights of citizens . . . .”  BETH, supra note 3, at 250.  Beth 
concluded that for Harlan “there was no constitutional logic to a differentiation between the 
rights of citizens of Utah territory and those of the Philippines.”  Id. at 256.  I am not sure that 
the Taft correspondence justifies these assertions, but it certainly indicates that Taft (who 
thought the islands unready for trial by jury and other niceties required by the Constitution) 
and Harlan had very different perspectives on these questions.  Professor Yarbrough also 
suggests that Harlan “champion[ed] . . . full citizenship for the ‘alien races’ of the 
noncontiguous territories . . . .”  YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 200.  I am not sure this is 
correct as to the political rights attached to citizenship. 
316. Downes, 182 U.S. 244, 369 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
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Three years later, in Gonzales v. Williams,317 the Court could have 
answered the question whether the inhabitants of Puerto Rico at the time 
of cession to the United States became citizens of the United States but 
chose not to do so.  Instead, Chief Justice Fuller, writing for a 
unanimous Court, held that citizens of Puerto Rico were not “aliens” but 
refused to answer the question whether they were citizens.  It seems 
likely the Court ducked the question because it was divided on the issue, 
although it is possible the justices merely chose to decide the case on the 
narrower ground presented by the holding in De Lima. 
If the Court was divided, where did Harlan stand on the political 
rights of citizenship?  His obvious discomfort with the idea that the 
United States would “rule over” subject peoples and the determination 
he consistently displayed to treat overseas acquisitions like the territories 
on the North American continent, hint that he supported citizenship.  
But, while noting that American citizens present in the Philippines 
would not be entitled to a jury trial if charged there, he grounded his 
dissents in Mankichi and Dorr on the application of the Sixth 
Amendment to all “persons” not just to citizens.  His reference in his 
1883 letter to his son James suggesting that we must eventually admit 
the Chinese who came here to citizenship, including the right to vote, 
suggests he was prepared to accept Chinese, Puerto Ricans, or Filipinos, 
for American citizenship.318  In Dorr, Justice Day, quoting Chief Justice 
John Marshall, had written whatever the status of inhabitants of the 
territories, “‘they do not share in the government’” until they achieve 
statehood.  In the meantime, United States citizens or not, they had only 
such share in the governance of the territory as Congress chose to grant 
them.319  Harlan did not challenge this statement.  Citizenship would not 
guarantee political participation, at least, not while the territory remained 
 
317. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904).  In Gonzales, a woman resident of 
Puerto Rico at the time of its cession to the United States, attempted to enter the United States 
through the port of New York.  Immigration officials refused her entry as an “alien 
immigrant” who was “likely to become a public charge.”  Id. at 7.  If she was an “alien 
immigrant,” by statute, the decision of the immigration officials was not subject to review by 
the courts.  The Court held that, as a citizen of Puerto Rico, she was not an alien, was entitled 
to free access to the United States, and that the limitation on judicial review of the 
immigration official’s decision did not apply.  The Court refused to decide, though asked, 
whether “the cession of Porto Rico accomplished the naturalization of its people;” or whether 
“a citizen of Porto Rico, under the act of 1900, is necessarily a citizen of the United States.”  
Id. at 12. 
318. This assumes that Harlan’s vote in Wong Kim Ark against Chinese citizenship by 
birth did not reflect hostility to the idea of Chinese citizenship, in general, but only 
disagreement over the meaning of the language of the citizenship clause.  See supra Part III.C. 
319. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904) (quoting Marshall, J., in American 
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 (1828)). 
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a territory and the citizen remained resident there, but it would bring 
other important rights including the right to relocate to a state. 
Finally, one might ask whether Harlan held all along the views he 
expressed in the Insular Cases, or whether he came to them only as those 
cases were presented for decision.320  His close friendship with Justice 
Brewer might have provided the stimulus for change if it occurred.  
However and whenever it happened, Harlan came to see racism and its 
insistence on the dominion of whites over people of color as the enemy 
of America’s republican institutions.  If his journey toward that 
understanding began with a defense of the full citizenship of Black 
Americans, he also seems to have come to understand that the 
subordination of Asians or Puerto Ricans or Filipinos implicated the 
same issues.  This realization led him to his impassioned dissents in 
Downes, Mankichi, and Dorr. 
CONCLUSION 
The first John Marshall Harlan was not a prophet; he was a human 
being.  But he was a human being who made a remarkable journey for a 
man of his time.  Born into a prominent slave-holding family in a slave-
holding state he became, after the Civil War abolished slavery, a 
champion of Black civil rights.321  While acknowledging this fact, some 
scholars have argued that Harlan’s egalitarianism had limits.  They have 
suggested that those limits are clearly displayed in the cases involving 
the rights of the Chinese that came to the Court upon which he sat. 
It is possible that Harlan filled-in the gaps in his knowledge about 
the Chinese by drawing on his nativist inclinations, informed by Justice 
Field’s “facts” about the Chinese or by Harlan’s own superficial 
knowledge of the larger public debate about Chinese immigration.  The 
evidence can be used to support this version of Harlan’s story.  There is 
an aside in Harlan’s Plessy dissent; there is a letter, which may have 
 
320. Eric Schepard, after accepting the revisionists’ characterization of Harlan’s 
position in the Chinese cases, argues that the Insular dissents show that Harlan changed his 
mind during the Spanish-American War, and extended his vision of a “color-blind” 
Constitution to the mixed races of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii.  See Schepard, 
supra note 173.  In contrast, I argue that Harlan’s position in the Chinese cases may have been 
inaccurately characterized by the revisionists as the product of anti-Chinese racism.  Thus, I 
suggest that Harlan did not change, but rather persevered in his views about race and the 
Constitution.  Whenever race prejudice and the insistence on the inferiority of nonwhite 
peoples threatened American republican institutions, Harlan argued in favor of constitutional 
republicanism and against race-consciousness in the law. 
321. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 
U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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embodied his views or may have merely suggested arguments to be used 
in a college debate.  There are many cases in which Harlan voted but did 
not write.  There are a few in which he wrote opinions.  Depending on 
how his silences and his words are understood, they can be made to 
implicate or to vindicate him. 
Harlan joined a unanimous Court in holding that Congress 
possessed plenary power over the subject of immigration and in 
deferring to the political choices of the political branches in deciding 
who should and who should not be admitted to the country,322 but he did 
not participate in the infamous Fong Yue Ting decision.  He accepted 
Congress’ decision to vest application of the Chinese Exclusion regime 
in administrative officials and to make their findings of fact conclusive 
and unreviewable by the courts.323  Harlan’s deference in the cases was 
grounded in his broad principles: his support for a broad reading of 
national power, his literalist reading of statutes and the Constitution, and 
on his commitment to allow matters committed by the Constitution to 
the political branches to be resolved there without judicial interference.  
Many of his votes in later cases involving immigration were pro forma 
applications of earlier cases and involved application of the principle of 
stare decisis.  Even in the face of stare decisis, his opinion in Yamataya 
v. Fisher324 and his vote in Chin Yow v. United States325 reveal a growing 
concern about the behavior of immigration officials and the unfairness of 
the proceedings over which they presided, and suggest that he felt the 
need for judicial oversight in at least some extreme cases. 
There were other Chinese cases besides those involving 
immigration.  He insisted that treaty rights be taken seriously in Chew 
Heong and, while recognizing that Congress could abrogate a treaty if it 
intended to do so, he insisted that intent must be clearly expressed.326  In 
other cases, Harlan favored protecting the Chinese, resident in the United 
States, from discriminatory laws, the discriminatory application of 
laws,327 and from violence directed at them by their white neighbors.328  
Though sometimes distinguishing between the rights of “citizens” and 
other “persons,” he argued that many constitutional protections extended 
not only to citizens, but to all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
 
322. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
323. See Ju Toy v. United States, 198 U.S 253 (1905); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 
185 U.S. 213 (1902); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).  
324. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
325. 208 U.S. 8 (1908). 
326. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
327. See Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
328. See Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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United States, including the Chinese.329 
Harlan’s votes and opinions in all of these cases can be explained 
without reference to racial animus.  Much depends, as is so often the 
case, on the eye of the beholder.  His critics have made artful use of the 
evidence in the story they tell about Harlan, but they have ignored 
features of the story, which make it more complex than they would have 
us believe and task him for failing to apply the modern understanding of 
due process and equal protection before they were invented. 
There is another way to tell the story about Harlan and the Chinese.  
This version begins with Harlan’s baseline as a champion of civil rights 
for Black Americans.  It continues with his passionate and persevering 
opposition to subordination based on race, and includes his votes in 
defense of the rights of the Chinese once in the United States to life, 
liberty, and property, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,330 Wong Wing v. United 
States,331 and in his dissent in Baldwin v. Franks.332  It continues with his 
warning to immigration officials in Yamataya v. Fisher,333 and his vote 
in Chin Yow v. United States,334 and ends with his ringing dissents in 
Downes v. Bidwell,335 Hawaii v. Mankichi,336 and Dorr v. United 
States,337 insisting that there is one Constitution for everyone subject to 
American sovereignty, and that it must be applied equally to all without 
regard to race. 
It is possible that Harlan wanted to keep the Chinese out of the 
United States, as he wanted to keep out other “strangers” whose 
“foreignness” he believed might undermine America’s political culture.  
But there is little to indicate that this opposition, if it existed, was 
grounded in particularized race prejudice.  Harlan clearly believed that 
once inside the United States, or under its sovereign control (in the case 
of overseas possessions), nonwhites were entitled to the same 
constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, and property, as were provided 
to white Americans.  Harlan’s nativism is a flaw, but it does not prove he 
was a racist. 
 
329. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 226 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 375 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
330. 118 U.S. 356. 
331. 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
332. 120 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
333. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
334. 208 U.S. 8 (1908). 
335. 182 U.S. at 375 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
336. 190 U.S. 197, 226 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
337. 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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It seems clear that, whether he arrived at the conclusions he 
expressed in the Insular Cases early or late, he was convinced that the 
demands of those determined to maintain white supremacy could only be 
satisfied by surrendering the republican principles, which Harlan 
believed were essential to American distinctiveness.  It was not who 
Americans were that thrilled Harlan but rather what they stood for.  
When forced to choose between racial subordination and the 
preservation of the founding documents, Harlan chose republicanism and 
the ideals. 
John Marshall Harlan was a human being and, as such, imperfect.  
But he was also admirable in his dedication to the principles the United 
States preaches but has not always realized in practice.  The late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries were a very dark time for 
Black Americans, Native Americans, and the Chinese in this country 
because of race prejudice.  There is no escaping the reality of America’s 
historical sins.  What the United States is and what its principles should 
make it, have been too often incongruent.  But just as we must 
acknowledge what is dark in the American past, so should we celebrate 
the light.  Even with his flaws, Harlan was one source of that light. 
 
